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Introduction
Productivity is the dark side of macroeconomics. It is hard to define, and, at the same
time, it plays a crucial role in explaining important issues such as why a country’s GDP
grows, why income is so unequally distributed across countries, as well as why some firms
exit an other stay in the market.
In all macroeconomic models output is a function of at least two elements: factors of
production like labor or capital, and something called the productivity of those factors.
We tend to have a clear idea of what factors of production are in real life (workers,
machines), but when it comes to productivity, there is no unique definition: technological
progress, better organization, managerial skills are just the first examples that comes to
mind. Harberger [1998] tells that during a visit to a clothing plant in Central America,
the owner told him how he obtained a 20 % reduction in real costs with the installation of
background music that played as the seamstresses worked. This is a productivity increase
indeed. But how would you categorize it?1
I think that a rewarding way to approach the productivity issue is to divide it in
two different components: technology and factor allocation. Productivity can be read as
technology - the efficiency with which factors are used in production - but it can also
be interpreted as the efficiency with which factors are allocated across the agents that
participate in the production process. The first component of productivity, technology, has
to do with new and more effective ways of processing the available factors of production.
The second component of productivity, factor allocation, suggests that it is possible to
obtain an increase in output keeping technology fixed by simply reallocating to their most
1This would not be a big problem if productivity was not accounting for such a large share of output.
Solow [1956] was the first to realize how increments in traditional inputs like capital and labor fell short in
explaining why output was growing. About one half of economic growth was explained by ”the residual”, or,
in Solow’s words, ”the measure of our ignorance”. The Solow residual is often associated with productivity.
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productive uses the available factors of production. This second approach clearly makes
sense as long as economic agents (countries, firms) are heterogeneous.
In this Thesis I will focus on factor allocation as a determinant of productivity. The
two chapters that make up the Thesis deals with the issue of factor allocation at different
levels: across countries in chapter 1, across firms in chapter 2. Both the chapters are
mainly empirical works.
In the first chapter I investigate the efficiency with which physical capital is allocated
across countries. This is a question that Lucas [1990] raised almost 20 years ago. He
found hard to reconcile the large differences in capital-labor ratios existing between rich
and poor countries with the scarce flows of physical capital observed in data. The puzzle
here is given by a textbook application of the neoclassical model where returns to capital
are inversely proportional to capital-labor ratios. So, if in a poor country there is a low
amount of physical capital available per each worker (as it is usually the case), the returns
of the next unit of capital invested there should be very high. As Lucas pointed out, ar-
bitrage opportunities should make people in richer countries invest in poor countries until
returns are equalized. Since we don’t observe such flows, two explanations are possible:
the first is that there are distortions out there - e.g. international financial market fric-
tions - that don’t allow capital to move freely across countries. This explanation implies
that there is plenty of investment opportunities out there whose benefits are not reaped
because international capital markets don’t work efficiently. If this was the case, the world
allocation of physical capital would not be optimal, and everyone would be better off by
reallocating capital from rich to poor countries. A second concurrent explanation is that
if capitals are not flowing from rich to poor countries is probably because their returns
in poor countries are not as high as a naive comparison of capital-to-labor ratios would
suggest.
In the first chapter I will present evidence suggesting that this second explanation
works better. I will do it by essentially test with new data how far the returns to physical
capital across countries actually are. The main finding of chapter 1 is that, when returns
to physical capital are properly measured, they are actually very similar across countries,
so we should not be surprised to observe small international capital flows. I basically
enrich the classical measure of returns to capital, the marginal product of physical capital,
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in order to take into account of other factors - such as the availability of human capital,
the quality of schooling, the health of the labor force, the substitutability between skilled
and unskilled workers and the share of physical capital in total output - that, I believe,
enters crucially in the investment decision.
In the second chapter I investigate the relationship between factor allocation at firm
level and aggregate total factor productivity (hereafter TFP). In order to do that I use
manufacturing firm level data of Chile and Mexico during 1980s. The main question I
raise here is how much the aggregate productivity of a country could increase by simply
reallocating capital and labor across its firms. This allows me to take into consideration
all the heterogeneity that exists at micro level and that is not taken into account by
macro models that relies on the ”one country, one representative firm” assumption. The
approach I follow here is the one proposed by Hsieh and Klenow [2009] who compare
the performance of China, India and United States in terms of the efficiency with which
they allocate resources across their manufacturing firms. Their idea is to switch the
focus from how efficiently a representative firm can transform inputs into output (within-
firm approach) to how efficiently inputs are allocated across different firms (between-firms
approach). A crucial advantage of this approach is that it is testable at micro-level using
plant data. I decided to apply this approach to the case of Chile and Mexico during the
1980s with the aim of shedding new light on why, in the aftermath of the severe crisis that
hit Latin America in 1982-83, Chile recovered quickly why Mexico stagnated until the
mid-1990s. The main finding of chapter 2 is that Chile showed a more efficient allocation
of resources across its manufacturing firms with respect to Mexico during that period. I
estimate potential gains in aggregate manufacturing TFP from moving Mexico to the level
of efficiency observed in Chile in the mid-1980s to be up to 11%.
The aim of this introduction is to depict the framework in which the two chapters
have been conceived. In the next two sections I will present a literature review divided by
chapters.
4
0.1 Literature Review of Chapter 1
In this section I review the explanations proposed by the literature on why capital is
so immobile internationally.
The literature on missing international capital flows starts with Lucas [1990] paper:
Why capital doesn’t flow from rich to poor countries?. Lucas perform a simple calibration
of the textbook neoclassical model and obtain as a result that returns to capital in India
should be 58 times higher than the returns in the US. Differences in returns of such a
magnitude are clearly at odds with the small flows of capital actually observed between
rich and poor countries.
Two main types of explanations of the ”Lucas’ paradox” have been proposed: dif-
ferences in countries’ fundamentals and international capital market imperfections. The
former basically claims that capital doesn’t flow from rich to poor countries because coun-
tries are different in fundamentals such as their level of technological progress, their avail-
ability of certain crucial factors of production like human capital or the quality of their
institutions. On the other hand, the international capital market imperfections’ argument
suggests that capital would actually flow towards poor countries, but it doesn’t because
there are distortions, like sovereign risk, that lower incentives to do so.
The approach proposed in the first chapter points to differences in fundamentals as
a key explanation of the lack of capital flows. I will focus on differences in human capi-
tal (including education, health and the substitutability across types of workers) and on
differences in the share of capital used in production.
There are, however, other potentially important differences in fundamentals proposed
by the literature. One stream of the literature has focused on institutions (see for example
Alfaro et al. [2008] or Papaioannou [2009]). Institutions are intended as the set of formal
and informal rules that govern a society. Institutions of different quality can, for instance,
guarantee different levels of property rights’ protection, an element that enters crucially
in the investment decision taken by foreign entrepreneurs. A poor country with plenty of
potentially interesting investment opportunities could not become a recipient of foreign
capital simply because the investment risk is significant. Even if expected returns are high,
an entrepreneur could decide not to invest in a country with weak institutions because the
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risk of expropriation by local government is also high.
Another stream of the literature has focused on different degrees of technology adoption
as a crucial determinant of capital flows (in the spirit of Parente and Prescott [2002] and
Parente and Prescott [1994]). If barriers to the adoption of new technologies are higher in
poor countries (or, simply, poor countries are less efficient in using existing technologies)
then poor countries will have a lower return to capital investment.
The second type of explanation, the one that relies on international financial market
imperfections, focuses on asymmetric information and sovereign risk. Large asymmetric
information on the domestic market between borrowers (local investors) and lenders (for-
eign investors) can generate under-investment from abroad (see on this the model proposed
by Gordon and Bovenberg [1996]). Sovereign risk (see for example Reinhart and Rogoff
[2004]) is another possible source of low investment in poor countries. It can take the
form of government default on loan contracts with foreigners or of expropriation of foreign
assets by local government.
It is important to notice here that all these possible explanations are likely to be highly
correlated with each other. A country with weak institutions has probably a labor force
with scarce average education, low skilled workers are more likely to use old technologies,
high political risk is associated with higher probabilities of default, low guarantees for for-
eign investors make investment outcomes more uncertain. These factors are all associated
with low incentives for foreign entrepreneurs to invest. Regressions have been used in sev-
eral of the papers presented in this review, but they are likely to be strongly biased in this
framework. Since all these competing explanations are highly correlated with each other,
it is hard to find a clean identification strategy or to interpret the obtained coefficients as
the sole effect of the included dependent variables.
I choose to tackle this issue in chapter 1 by using a calibration approach. I will basically
assume a production function form, compute a standard measure of returns to capital as
the marginal product of physical capital, and then bring this simple measure to data and
check its predictions in terms of capital flows across countries.
The closer reference to my work is Caselli and Feyrer [2007] that, using a different
calibration, reach a very similar result: once properly measured, marginal products of
capital between rich and poor countries are not that far apart from each other. Caselli
6
and Feyrer [2007] documents an even stronger stylized fact: the marginal product of capital
is actually higher in rich countries. Lucas might have asked exactly the wrong question,
the right being: why capital doesn’t flow from poor to rich countries?
0.2 Literature Review of Chapter 2
In this section I review the literature establishing a link between factor allocation
across firms and how this can affect aggregate productivity.
Here the micro and macro level are quite connected: a different degree of allocative
efficiency across firms between two countries can translate in important differences in
aggregate TFP between them. Macroeconomists in the last years are more and more
interested in this kind of micro evidence, quoting Syverson they are
[..] dissecting aggregate productivity growth, the source of almost all per capita
income differences across countries, into various micro components, with the
intent of better understanding the sources of such growth.
The crucial question that have been asked by the literature is: what kind of distortions
can prevent the optimal use of resources to be reached in equilibrium? Each work reviewed
in this section has in mind a different mechanism: labor market regulations, firm size
restrictions, lack of meritocracy in appointing companies’ managers, trade barriers or any
kind of vested interests that block firm dynamics (growth, exit, entry).
This literature starts with empirical works documenting large heterogeneity in terms
of size and productivity at firm level (e.g. Bartelsman et al. [2009], Foster et al. [2008]),
even within very narrowly defined sectors2 . Heterogeneity can obviously be due to many
reasons, but it raises questions about how close real markets within countries are to the
neoclassical vision where all firms are threaten as one. In economic theory an efficient al-
location is not associated with large heterogeneity across agents operating in the economy.
An efficient allocation is one in which resources are allocated such that there is no way to
increase aggregate productivity by redistributing resources across firms. In more technical
2The more narrowly are sectors defined, the less of an issue is the assumption that all firms in the same
sector produce the same kind of good, or, in other terms, that they all have the same production function
inside each sector. The existence in the real world of different varieties of the same good, each one of a
different quality, makes this exercise an heroic one.
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terms, an efficient allocation is one in which marginal products of factors are equalized
across all firms producing the same good. If two firms produce the same good and enjoy
the same technology but do not have the same marginal products, it means that there is
some kind of misallocation in place.3
Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] claim that one important factor behind the observed
firm heterogeneity is government intervention. They stress how any kind of policy can
change factors’ prices (wages and returns to capital) faced by different producers and, as
a consequence, how these differences in prices can potentially have substantial negative
effects in terms of aggregate productivity. They propose a model with idiosyncratic dis-
tortions at firm level. In their model, upon entering in the market, each firm draw from
a joint distribution a productivity and an specific output tax τ that can take the form
of a tax (positive τ) or of a subsidy (negative τ). What they find is that no matter if
idiosyncratic distortions (read taxes) are correlated or uncorrelated with firm-level pro-
ductivity, they have negative effects on aggregate output and TFP. This means that even
if subsidies entail reallocation towards more productive units they will distort the optimal
establishment size. Their take is that government intervention is always negative, since
any intervention, even in favor of less productive firms, allow some firms that wouldn’t
operate in a market free of distortions to actually stay in the market. Whether this is so
bad is an open question. Are there plausible reasons why you may want less productive
firms operating in the market? This could be the case if a government aims at contain-
ing unemployment, or if a government think that some sectors are strategic for future
development and must be protected even if, at the moment, they are not competitive4.
The theoretical approach proposed by Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] has been applied
to manufacturing firm level data by Hsieh and Klenow [2009]. They build a simple model
where the dispersion in marginal products of capital and labor within individual four digit
manufacturing sectors can be read as a measure of distortions operating in that sector.
The main message of the empirical exercise they propose is that there are large margins
3As an example suppose that firm A and firm B use only labor to produce the same good, and firm A
has an higher marginal product of labor. This implies that firm A has an unexploited potential (i.e. firm
A could use the next unit of input more efficiently than firm B) and therefore that the society would be
better off by moving resources from firm B to firm A until their marginal products equalize.
4Maybe those firms that seem that unproductive are simply investing in R&D and the benefits of this
investment will be seen only in the future
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for aggregate TFP improvements by reallocating resources across heterogeneous firms.
Taking the US as a benchmark of efficiency, they estimate potential manufacturing TFP
gains of 30-50% in China and 40-60% in India deriving by the reallocation of resources
across firms to the level of efficiency observed in the US. These numbers show how gains
from reallocation in terms of income can be potentially significant. Hsieh and Klenow
[2009] also try to match their measure of misallocation with explicit government policies
in China and India. In China they claim most of the misallocation within industries could
come from the presence of state owned plants that survive because subsidized, although
not efficient. They observe how the process of privatization that took place in China, and
the consequent decrease in state owned plants, has brought to free resources that have
then been reallocated to more productive firms. In India misallocation within industries is
mostly attributed to licensing and size restrictions5, all policies that may prevent efficient
plants to reach the optimal scale.
The fact that factors of production are not efficiently allocated, especially in developing
countries, has been confirmed also by another stream of the literature that focus on natural
experiments. In their paper ”The Misallocation of Capital”, Banerjee et al. [2003] try
to answer the following question: are Indian (small) firms credit constrained? To do
that they use as an exogenous source of variation the change in the threshold for being
considered a small firm decided by the Indian government in 1998. If a firm is defined as
”small” it become automatically eligible for subsidized credit by banks. This change in
policy allowed them to compare the investment behavior of firms that were not considered
”small” before 1998 and that became ”small” after 1998. They find a gap between the
marginal product of capital of Indian credit constrained firms and market interest rate of
at least 70%. When these credit constrained firms become eligible for subsidized credit
lines they increase in size, and probably decrease in their MPK. In the terms of Hsieh
and Klenow [2009] approach, a better allocation means a lower dispersion in MPK across
firms.
In another case study Banerjee et al. [2003] show how factors like belonging to a specific
community could matter a lot in the allocation of capital and the availability of credit in
a country like India. They show how in the city of Tirupur (Southern India) the local
5See on size restriction also Guner et al. [2008].
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cast of the Gounders dominates the local knitted garment industry thanks to the easier
access to capital they have due to social ties, while firms run by outsiders, although more
productive, can’t prevail due to their weak access to capital. This can be read as a case of
misallocation, where capital would be better used by outsiders, but a distortion like social
ties in the local cast group do not allow the more efficient allocation.
Going back at more aggregate level, Bartelsman et al. [2009] investigate the effect of
firm specific distortions on aggregate outcomes. They propose as a measure of distortion
the covariance within industries between size and productivity, where higher covariance
would imply that more productive firms do not face any prevention to become larger.
Their key empirical finding is that there is substantial variation across countries in the
within industries covariance between size and productivity.
If Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] identifies distortions with any type of government
intervention, other papers have a more specific shot on what could be a potential driver
of inefficient allocation of resources in a market. Caselli and Gennaioli [2003] (and, sim-
ilarly Buera and Shin [2010]) points to the ability to select the right people for decision
making. They claim that this could be an important source of differences in the returns a
firm can make from the available resources. In particular they focus on the intergenera-
tional transmission of managerial responsibilities in family firms (what they call ”dynastic
management”).
Midrigan and Xu [2010] focus on financial frictions and try to investigate how they can
distort resource allocation among firms. Using Colombian and South Korean manufac-
turing firm level data they find that financing frictions are important: roughly half of the
plants in our sample are financially constrained. However, their model fails in generating
important TFP losses since the most productive establishments have the ability to quickly
accumulate internal funds and overcome the borrowing constraint.
All these papers face similar issues, in particular when it comes to measure productivity.
What kind of productivity at firm level are we looking at is a crucial question. In a very
influential paper Foster et al. [2008] underline the differences between revenue and physical
productivity. Physical productivity is inversely correlated to price (more efficient you are,
lower price you will be able to charge) while revenue productivity is positively correlated
with prices (being the revenue productivity the product of physical productivity and price
10
at firm level). Mixing the two, and using revenue productivity as a proxy for technical
efficiency can lead, for example, to understate the physical productivity of a young firm
simply because it is charging lower prices in order to gain a share of the market. The
main point of their paper is that selection occurs on profitability and not on productivity,
thought the two are likely correlated. However what is most interesting is their observation
that if one can not observe firm level prices the differences in output and input prices
across firms within an industry are embodied in their productivity measures. Therefore,
all measures of productivity that do not take this into account are dirty and must be read
with cautious.
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Chapter 1
Capital Productivity and Capital
Allocation Across Countries
1.1 Introduction and motivating evidence
In this chapter I propose a calibration that could shed new light on why capital is so
immobile internationally. The large differences in the capital-per-worker ratios that we
observe across countries would suggest that there is room for significative improvement on
the current allocation. According to the neoclassical theory, in fact, capital should flow
from relatively capital rich to relatively capital poor countries. However, as Lucas [1990]
points out, we do not observe large flows of capital from the capital rich US to the capital
poor India in the real world. On top of that, the flows of capital across countries in general
appears small with respect to world GDP.
Until the mid-1990s the sum of current accounts of all countries was stagnating around
2% of world GDP. This number counts both inflows and outflows, so we could say that
until mid-1990s every year just 1% of world GDP moved across countries. This number
seems quite small if one thinks that there are countries, like Sweden or Denmark, that
devote every year 1% of their GDP to foreign aid. As Figure 1.1 shows, starting from
mid-1990s the share of world GDP that moved across countries more than doubled. In
2005 the share of current account on GDP was around 5%. This is still a rather small
number relative to the huge dispersion we observe in the availability of physical capital
per worker across countries. If we were to observe the distribution of physical capital per
12
worker in 2005, a country at the 90th percentile of the distribution had 70 times more
capital per worker with respect to a country at the 10th percentile, a country at the 99th
percentile had almost 300 times more capital per worker with respect to a country in the
1st percentile.
Figure 1.1 Share of Current Accounts on World GDP, in % points
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
Current Account share in World GDP, in % points
Cu
rre
nt
 A
cc
ou
nt
 s
ha
re
 in
 W
or
ld 
GD
P,
 in
 %
 p
oi
nt
s
1980
1980
5
1985
9
1990 1995
00
2000 2005
Yea
Year
Besides the small magnitude, also the net direction of physical capital flows across
countries is unclear. One would expect that at least the fraction of physical capital the
moves internationally flows from rich to poor countries. This is not exactly what seems
to happen, at least at first sight.
As Figure 1.2 shows the net current account of rich countries1 in 2005, the last year of
my sample, is negative. A negative number means that, in rich countries, capital inflows
have been larger than capital outflows in 2005. The opposite is true for poor countries
where capital outflows are higher than capital inflows2. In 2005, 0.4% of World GDP
1Rich countries are those countries with output per worker higher than 32,000 PPP adjusted 2005
international dollars. To make it clear, these are countries richer than Portugal.
2Each country’s current account is measured in PPP international dollars and weighted by the share of
GDP of that country in World GDP. The word ”net” means that for each group (rich and poor countries)
I summed up these weighted current accounts so that the result is the net flow of capital: it is an inflow
if the number is positive, an outflow if the number is negative. The two numbers do not sum up to 0
(we should expect world net current account to be 0), this could be due to multiple reasons: first, here
I am considering a big sample, 129 countries, but not the entire population of countries (the term World
here refers to the total of countries considered, excluding those for which I don’t have the relevant data);
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flowed into rich countries while 0.9% of World GDP flowed out from poor countries
Figure 1.2 Net Current Account of Rich and Poor countries, 2005
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Note: data from PWT6.3, WDI(2009), author’s calculation.129 countries, year 2005. See Appendix A for more details.
Figure 1.3 reports net current accounts split by region of the world. Advanced Economies
(that are basically OECD countries) have been net capital importer with a net negative
current account of around 1% of World GDP in 2005, while almost all other regions of
the world are net capital exporter, the only exceptions being Sub-Saharian Africa whose
negative number is probably almost totally accounted by foreign aid, and South Asia.
As Figure 1.4 shows, poor countries seems to have become net capital exporter only
in the last decade while before they were mostly net recipient of foreign capital. On the
other hand, rich country have been net recipient of world capital ever since the 1980s.
Given that current account data takes into account not only movement of private capi-
tal but also operations carried out by governments, I also look at foreign direct investment
statistics as an alternative measure of movements of physical capital across countries. Fig-
ure 1.5 shows the net share on world GDP of FDI in rich and poor countries. Here the
patterns seem more stable over time and consistent with neoclassical predictions. Poor
countries are on average recipients of FDI while rich countries are on average exporter of
FDI. Again, even using FDI data, the magnitudes are small, FDI net flows rarely go above
half a percentage point in absolute value.
second, here I am working with PPP dollars, so the deflators change from country to country depending
on the price level of the basket of consumption goods considered; third, there is always the possibility of
measurement errors in national accounts
14
Figure 1.3 Net Current Account by Region, 2005
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Figure 1.4 Net Current Account of Rich and Poor countries, 1980-2005
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Note: data from PWT6.3, WDI(2010), author’s calculation.129 countries, year 2005. See Appendix A for more details.
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Figure 1.5 Net FDI of Rich and Poor countries, 1980-2005
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Note: data from PWT6.3, WDI(2010), author’s calculation.129 countries, year 2005. See Appendix A for more details.
1.2 Aim and main results of the chapter
All the empirical evidence presented in this introduction suggests two things:
1. Capital flows seem to be quite a small fraction of World GDP
2. There is no clear pattern in the direction of capital flows between poor and rich
countries.
These two facts together suggest that physical capital does not move much, and if
it does, it doesn’t seem to respond to differences in capital per worker. The aim of
this chapter is therefore to test with new data how far the returns to physical capital
across countries actually are. In the following sections I analyze the predictions of the
neoclassical model starting from its simplest formulation. In each section I introduce new
ingredients to the simplest formulation and check the contribution of each ingredient to
our understanding of capital flows. In each section I also perform a new calibration and
compare the ratio of returns to capital in poor versus rich countries. The main result of
the chapter is to provide evidence that, when properly accounted, the returns to physical
capital essentially equalize between rich and poor countries.
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1.3 Lucas’s result
In this section I briefly sum up Lucas [1990] original results. To make his point Lucas
uses data from US and India, taken as representative of rich (US) and poor (India) coun-
tries, and assumes that, in both of them, production obeys a Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale and a common intercept3:
Y = AKαL1−α
where Y is output, A is technology, K is physical capital and L is labor. Under this
framework the marginal product of capital is:
MPK = αA
(
K
L
)α−1
Assuming equal technologies (A) across countries and setting α = 0.4, Lucas obtains
an India-US ratio of MPK equal to 58, meaning that the return to 1 unit of capital
invested in India should be 58 times higher than 1 unit of capital invested in the US.
Correcting its calibration for human capital using estimates from Krueger [1968], Lucas
arrives to a final estimate of the India-US ratio of MPK equal to 5. A natural implication
of its exercise is that, in front of return differentials of this magnitude, we should observe
net investments rapidly flow from the US to India and other developing countries.
1.4 Lucas’s result 20 years later
My starting point is the replication of Lucas [1990] computation using data available
today4. The framework proposed by Lucas has the following characteristics:
1. Production function is Cobb-Douglas, and common to poor and rich countries.
2. Capital is physical reproducible capital, calculated with the standard perpetual in-
ventory method5.
3. TFP is not allowed to change across countries.
3This implies no differences in TFP across the two countries.
4For a detailed description of all the variables used in this section see Appendix A.
5See Appendix A for details on how I computed physical capital stock starting from investment flows.
17
4. The capital share (α) is assumed constant across countries6.
5. Labour is only raw labour, meaning: number of workers.
Hence:
yc = Akαc
where yc is output per worker, A is TFP and kc is physical capital stock per worker.
The subscript c identify country-specific variables. Setting A = 1 I obtain the first estimate
of MPK:
MPKc = αkα−1c (1.1)
Table 1.1 reports the results of the calibration exercise under this first framework.
The first row shows the ratio of marginal products of poor versus rich countries, where
MPK is computed as in equation 1.1.
The number I obtain is 6.6, to be interpreted as capital being 6.6 times more productive
in poor with respect to rich country. The second row shows the ratio of marginal products
of India versus US, the differential in capital returns is 6.8.
Table 1.1 Framework 1: Basic calibration
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F1 Ratio of MPK India/ US 6.8
Remember that in this very basic formulation I still do not take into account differences
in human capital, as Lucas does in the more sophisticated calibration presented in his
paper. Therefore, the numbers presented in Table 1.1 have to be compared with those
that Lucas obtains in the simplest calibration, according to which capital in India was
6I will use the US value of 0.33, this is different from the 0.4 used in Lucas [1990], but it is the most
widely measure used today. Even though a constant α across countries is clearly rejected by data, the
correlation between α and income per capita is not significantly different from 0, meaning that I am not
not systematically assigning an higher (or lower) alpha to rich (or poor) countries.
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58 more productive than in the US! This is indeed a sign that, even in the most brute
calibration, the returns between poor and rich countries are not that far away as they
appeared 20 years ago. However, a ratio of 5-6 is still more than enough to justify flows
in the opposite direction with respect to what we observe in data.
As Figure 1.14 shows, the estimate of MPK under this first framework is highly
correlated with GDP per worker. Rich countries have low MPK primarily because they
have higher k with respect to poor countries.
Figure 1.6 Relationship between MPK and GDP per worker under Lucas
calibration
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Figure 1.7 shows the relationship between MPK and current accounts. We expect this
relationship to be negative since countries with higher MPK should be capital importer
(negative current account) and vice versa for countries with lower MPK. Looking at Fig-
ure 1.7 the relationship is actually negative but not strongly significant (t-stat: -2.24,
p-value: 0.027).
1.5 Controlling for human capital
In this section I explore how much differences in human capital across countries matters
in accounting for differences in the productivity of physical capital. In other words, I take
19
Figure 1.7 Relationship between Current Account and MPK with Lucas cal-
ibration
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into the picture differences in the quality of workers across countries. This is something
that Lucas already tried in his paper using estimates of human capital from Krueger
[1968]. Here I am using data that were not available at the time Lucas wrote his paper.
In particular I take into account different aspects of human capital: quantity (measured
in years) of schooling, health and quality of schooling/parenting.
1.5.1 Schooling Capital
To control for the level of schooling I use the specification proposed by Hall and Jones
[1999]. I assume that there is a mapping from years of schooling to human capital. To
formalize this mapping I use results taken from labor economics. This second framework
shares the first 4 basic assumptions with the first framework (common Cobb-Douglas
production function, capital is physical reproducible capital, TFP and capital shares are
not allowed to change across countries). What changes is that now output is produced
using not only capital and raw labor but also human capital (per worker), hc, that is
defined as follows:
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hc =
J∑
j=1
eβsSjLj,c (1.2)
where Lj,c is the proportion of labour force in educational attainment group j (in
country c), Sj is years of schooling of educational attainment group j and βs is the Min-
cerian return to schooling for those with s years of schooling. The Mincerian return is set
constant and equal to 0.17.
The schooling group are those proposed by Barro et al. [2010]. They report, for each
country, the proportion of labour force with:
1. No education
2. Some primary
3. Primary completed
4. Some secondary
5. Secondary completed
6. Some college
7. College completed and more
Having data on the proportion of labor force in each educational attainment group, the
duration of each schooling level and the mincerian return, I have all I need to construct a
more sophisticated measure of MPK. The new production function is:
Yc = kαc h
1−α
c = k
α
c
 J∑
j=1
eβsSjLj,c
1−α
and the marginal product of physical capital is now defined as:
MPKc = α
(
kc
hc
)α−1
= α
 kc(∑J
j=1 e
βsSjLj,c
)
α−1 (1.3)
7This calibration is based on results of log-wage regressions (in the most simple specification: logWj,c =
αc + βsSj) suggesting that one extra year of schooling increases earnings (and hence human capital) by
about 10% on average. This is a rough average computed considering both poor and rich countries together.
It can be interpreted as follows: if workers in country A have on average one year of schooling more than
in country B, country A has 10% more human capital than country B.
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With respect to Hall and Jones [1999], where β varies with average schooling years,
here I use a common mincerian return 0.1. It is worth notice that this has no impact
whatsoever on the computation results.
Table 1.2 reports the results of the ratios of MPK of poor/rich countries (and India/US)
under the framework with schooling capital. As Table 1.2 shows, once one takes into
account difference in human capital, the ratio of MPK between poor and rich countries
shrink to 2.8 (2.2 between India and US). This number, however, is still big enough to
justify capital movements from rich to poor countries.
Table 1.2 Framework 2: adding Schooling Capital
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 141
Ratio of MPK India/ US
F1 Basic calibration 6.8
F2 + Schooling capital 2.2
Figure 1.8 and Figure 1.9 shows the relationship between the MPK and GDP per
worker and the relationship between the MPK and Current Account respectively. Once
we correct for schooling capital the relationship between MPK and GDP per worker is
not as strong as in the basic calibration, while current account seem to respond more to
variation in MPK with respect to the basic calibration (t-stat: -3.03, p-value: 0.003).
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Figure 1.8 Relationship between MPK and GDP per worker with Schooling
capital
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Figure 1.9 Relationship between Current Account and MPK with Schooling
capital
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1.5.2 Health Capital
Health is certainly another factor to be taken into account when controlling for the
quality of workers. Borrowing from Weil [2007] I add health capital to the definition of
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human capital:
hc =
J∑
j=1
eβHHj+βsSjLj,c (1.4)
Where groups are now schooling-health groups, Hj is the health indicator for group j,
and βH maps health status in human capital. As an indicator of health status I use the
adult survival rate, that is the probability of reaching 60 years conditional on reaching 15
years.
Since survival rate data at schooling group level were not available, in practice I could
not use equation 1.4. I use instead the following formulation where the health indicator
is common to all schooling group (and varies only across countries):
hc = eβHH¯c
J∑
j=1
eβsSjLj,c (1.5)
To calibrate βH I build upon existing empirical studies mapping survival rate into
height, and then height into wages8. This literature proposes a βH ≈ 0.6539, and this is
the number I use to calibrate the new estimate of MPK:
MPKc = α
(
kc
hc
)α−1
= α
(
kc
eβHH¯c
∑J
j=1 e
βsSjLj,c
)α−1
(1.6)
Table 1.3 reports the results of the calibration adding health capital. The results
doesn’t change much, but still bring to a lower difference in returns to physical capital
between poor and rich countries.
Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 mimic closely those with only schooling capital.
8See Weil [2007] and Schultz [2002] on how to get unbiased estimates of the return to health
9Note that I use the adult survival rate (ASR) in distance from the country with the lower ASR
(Zimbabwe).
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Table 1.3 Framework 3: adding Health Capital
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 141
F3 + Health capital 2.6 141
Ratio of MPK India/ US
F1 Basic calibration 6.8
F2 + Schooling capital 2.2
F3 + Health capital 2.1
Figure 1.10 Relationship between MPK and GDP per worker with Health
capital
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1.5.3 Quality of Schooling/Parenting
I this section I try to take into account differences in the quality of schooling across
countries10. In order to do so, I borrow from Caselli [2005] and use standardized test
scores. Standardized test scores can be interpreted as a sign of schooling quality11, or as
10Human capital is not only a matter of the number of years of schooling, but also of the quality of the
schooling itself.
11Though micro evidence on that is weak, more on that in Hanushek and Woessmann [2008] that
underlines big cross-country differences in standardized test scores, at given age
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Figure 1.11 Relationship between Current Account and MPK with Health
capital
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a sign of differences in parental inputs12.
I add test scores to the calibration and interpret them as a summary indicator of school
quality/parental background. The new definition of human capital per worker is:
hc = eβT T¯ceβHH¯c
J∑
j=1
eβsSjLj,c (1.7)
where βT is coefficient on test score in log-wage regression and T is test-score average
at country level. Data on test scores are from World Development Indicators (2009) and
cover standardized test imparted by international agencies to pupils in their 8th grade. In
particular I use the TIMSS math and science test and the PIRLS reading test imparted by
the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement13 , and the
PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) math, science and reading tests,
coordinated by the OECD14.
Data on test scores refers to different dates and different sets of countries between 1995
and 2007. However there is an high correlation across different tests for the same country.
12On this point the micro evidence is more convincing, see Leibowitz [1977].
13See more details in the Appendix A and in http://timss.bc.edu/.
14Although they cover also non-OECD countries. More on sample selection in what follows.
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I construct the indicator of test score (Tc) as the average score over all available tests in
each country15. To calibrate βT I use Lazear [2003], that run the following regression on
data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey:
log(Wi) = α+ βTTi + εi,
where Wi is the wage of individual i observed in late 20s of his/her life, and Ti is the
result of a school test that is very similar to the international ones used in the cross-country
exercize. Lazear [2003] finds a βT = 0.01.
The new estimate of MPK is therefore as in equation 1.8:
MPKc = α
(
kc
hc
)α−1
= α
(
kc
eβT T¯ceβHH¯c
∑J
j=1 e
βsSjLj,c
)α−1
(1.8)
Table 1.4 reports calibration results adding Test Scores. The ratio of MPK between
poor and rich countries is now 1.2, very close to the equalization of capital returns. Since
there is no test score data for India I have no results for the ratio of MPK between India
and US.
Table 1.4 Framework 4: adding Test Scores
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 141
F3 + Health capital 2.6 141
F4 + Test scores 1.2
Ratio of MPK India/ US
F1 Basic calibration 6.8
F2 + Schooling capital 2.2
F3 + Health capital 2.1
F4 + Test scores .
A possible concern in using test scores is the sample bias over rich countries. This is
because most of the countries participating in international programs of student evaluation
15See Appendix A for a detailed description of how I constructed this indicator.
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are middle or high income countries. Figure 1.12 suggests that this concern is potentially
important16.
Figure 1.12 Relationship between MPK and GDP per worker with Test scores
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To correct for sample selection I compute again the ratio of MPK between poor and rich
countries in framework 3 (the one with health capital) using only the sample of countries
for which test score data are available. I obtain a ratio of 1.27 in framework 3 (1.22
in framework 4) meaning that adding test scores only make the ratio decrease by 0.05,
and not by 1.4 as Table 1.4 suggests. This implies that most of the decrease showed in
Table 1.4 is due to sample selection. I will therefore do not report the calibration results
for test scores in the following Tables.
1.5.4 Imperfect Substitution in Schooling
Labor force in each country is not an homogenous collection of equally skilled workers,
it is instead a collection workers with different degree of skills. In this section I use
a formulation of human capital that takes these differences into account distinguishing,
in the simplest specification possible, between skilled and unskilled workers17. I back out
skilled and unskilled labor force from the education attainment of workers in each country.
16Most country-observation are on the right of the x-scale (GDP per worker)
17I assume that unskilled and skilled workers are imperfect substitutes.
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Workers attaining a certain level of schooling are defined as skilled, those who do not attain
a certain level are defined as unskilled18
Following Caselli [2010] I model imperfect substitution replacing
hc =
J∑
j=1
eβsSjLj,c
With
hc =
z−1∑
j=1
eβjLj,c
ρ +B
 J∑
j=z
eβjLj,c
ρ1/ρ (1.9)
Where:
• z is lowest schooling group in high-education labour force. This is the minimum
level of education that a worker have to reach to be defined as skilled.
• β1 = βz = 119 while the other βjs are relative productivities
• 1/(1− ρ) is the elasticity of substitution
To construct a new estimate of MPK based on imperfect substitution I need to cal-
ibrate the parameter ρ that governs elasticity of substitution (EOS), the βj , the returns
to education that is likely to be different for each education group, and B, a parameter
governing relative productivities of education groups.
As for ρ, many estimates of EOS are clustered around 1.4, 1.5. In particular, I choose
the number proposed by Ciccone and Peri [2005] tha,t using US census data and an IV
econometric approach20, find an estimate of EOS = 1.5.
As for βj I use the numbers proposed by Caselli [2010]. To calibrate the returns to
education at different education levels he uses data on white males taken from the Current
Population Survey in the US (1991). The methodology is the following. He firstly creates
7 dummy variables, corresponding to seven schooling groups proposed by Barro et al.
18Educational attainment is likely to determine, at least in part, the skills of each worker. This aspect
is not considered in the Hall-Jones schooling capital measure.
19I set to 1 the βs of the base education sub-group in lower (no schooling) and higher (secondary school
completed) education labor force.
20They set z as high-school completed, as I do here
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[2010] 21, and then basically runs two separate log-wage regressions to estimate the 7 βjs:
log(Wj , j < z) = α+ βj
log(Wj , j ≥ z) = α+ βj
In the first regression he only puts dummies for the bottom four groups, in the second
regression only the dummies for the top three groups22. The results are showed in Table 1.5
Table 1.5 Calibrated βjs
Low Education High Education
No Schooling 0 Secondary Complete 0
Some Primary 0.32 Some College 0.14
Completed Primary 0.38 College and More 0.46
Some Secondary 0.56
As for the parameter governing imperfect substitution (B), it is calibrated as follows:
• From
z−1∑
j=1
eβjLj,c
ρ +B
 J∑
j=z
eβjLj,c
ρ1/ρ
• one can rewrite the wage premium as in equation 1.10 using perfect labor markets
(equalization of marginal products between skilled and unskilled workers):
Wz,c
W1,c
= B
(∑J
j=z e
βjLj,c
)ρ−1
(∑z−1
j=1 e
βjLj,c
)ρ−1 eβzeβ1 = B
(∑J
j=z e
βjLj,c
)ρ−1
(∑z−1
j=1 e
βjLj,c
)ρ−1 (1.10)
• From equation 1.10 one can retrieve B if for at least one country both relative wage
and relative supply are observable. This is the case for the US where the relative
21The 7 schooling groups in Barro et al. [2010] are: no schooling, primary incomplete, primary com-
plete, secondary incomplete, secondary complete, higher incomplete, higher complete. See more on this in
Appendix A.
22In both regressions are included controls for full set of age dummies.
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supply of skilled versus unskilled workers is equal to 3 and where relative wage (from
a CPS log-wage regression) is equal to 2.29.Then B for the US is therefore equal to
4.76, and this number is then applied to all other countries.
The new estimate of MPK is therefore as in equation 1.11:
MPKc = α
(
kc
hc
)α−1
= α
 kc
eβHH¯c
[(∑z−1
j=1 e
βjLj,c
)ρ
+ 4.76
(∑J
j=z e
βjLj,c
)ρ]1/ρ

α−1
(1.11)
Notice that in equation 1.11: (i) the imperfect substitutability framework substitutes
the framework of schooling capital as in the Hall and Jones [1999] formulation, (ii) the
health capital is taken into account while (iii) the quality of schooling/parenting is not.
Table 1.6 Framework 5: adding Imperfect Substitution
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 141
F3 + Health capital 2.6 141
F5 + Imperfect substitution 2.2 141
Ratio of MPK India/ US
F1 Basic calibration 6.8
F2 + Schooling capital 2.2
F3 + Health capital 2.1
F5 + Imperfect substitution 1.1
The results obtained using the measure of marginal product of physical capital in
equation 1.11 are reported in table 1.6. The sample of countries is (almost) exactly
the same as in the basic calibration, therefore it is not sample selection to drive the
result. The ratio of returns between poor and rich countries lowers to 2.2 , while returns
to capital in India and US under this framework are almost equalized: their ratio is
1.1. This last number suggests that differences in the returns to physical capital between
India and US, once we correct for differences in human capital, start to disappear. The
Lucas’s paradox, according to which the neoclassical framework predicts a fivefold return
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differential between India and US (that we do not see in real data), seems to be vanishing as
we go correcting his measures. However, when we consider the whole sample of countries,
the ratio is still bigger than 2, meaning there is still room for improvement.
Figure 1.13 Relationship between MPK and GDP per worker under imperfect
substitutability framework
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Figure 1.14 Relationship between Current Account and MPK under imperfect
substitutability framework
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1.6 Controlling for country-varying capital shares
What emerges from the last section is that when one controls accurately for human
capital, the ratio of returns to physical capital between poor and rich countries almost
equalize. In this section I take the measure of human capital that gives better results23
and start changing another important parameter that I kept fixed so far: the measure of
capital share in income. This parameter, that I called α, governs the share of output used
to reward factor K, physical capital. So far the parameter α have been kept constant
across countries and set equal to the number that (economists believe) best describes the
capital share of output in the US, that is: 0.33. In this section I allow this parameter to
change at country level and check how the ratios of returns to physical capital between
poor and rich country change when I add this additional source of variation.
1.6.1 Bernanke and Gollin ”naive” measure of capital shares
The first measures of capital share I use are from Bernanke and Gurkaynak [2001] and
Gollin [2002]. Since a direct estimate of the capital share does not exists, country-specific
αs are computed subtracting from the value of output the amount payed to the other
factor of production (i.e. labor)24. In this framework I compute MPK as:
MPKc = αwc
(
kc
hc
)αwc−1
(1.12)
where hc is human capital adjusted for health and imperfect substitutability of workers
with different skills and αwc is country varying capital share according to Bernanke and
Gurkaynak [2001]
The results obtained under this framework are showed in table 1.7: the ratio of
marginal products jumps to 21.8, ten times higher the last estimate obtained in the pre-
vious section. Does this number mean the complete failure of the empirical approach
followed so far? I think it doesn’t, for a bunch of reasons I am about to present. First,
the sample used to perform the last calculation is one third of the sample used in the
23I.e. the one that takes into account health capital and imperfect substitutability of workers with
different skills.
24The amount of the value of output that goes to labor is computed multiplying wages by the number
of workers (country’s total payroll).
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previous frameworks, and it is unbalanced towards rich countries25. Second, the numbers
proposed by Bernanke and Gurkaynak [2001] are computed as 1980-1995 averages, while
data on physical and human capital used to calibrate equation 1.12 refers to 2005. Third,
and more importantly, these estimates of capital shares, as an influential paper by Caselli
and Feyrer [2007] underlines, essentially take into account payments that go to all types
of capital26, while when estimating MPK we are interested in payments that go only to
physical reproducible capital. As I show in the next section, the results change a lot when
using the ”right” capital shares.
Table 1.7 Framework 6: Bernanke capital shares
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 141
F3 + Health capital 2.6 141
F5 + Imperfect substitution 2.2 141
F6 + Bernanke capital shares 21.8 53
25That are usually countries for which it is easier to find data on payroll, and, therefore, on capital
shares.
26The other types of capital being essentially land and natural resources.
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1.6.2 Caselli ”land adjusted” measure
In this section I compute MPK using the estimates of reproducible capital shares
proposed by Caselli and Feyrer [2007]. MPK is defined as:
MPKc = αkc
(
kc
hc
)αkc−1
(1.13)
where, as before, hc is human capital adjusted for health and imperfect substitutability
of workers with different skills and αkc is computed as follows:
αkc = αwc ∗ Kc
Wc
(1.14)
where KcWc is the ratio of physical reproducible capital over total wealth, that includes
the value of all types of capital27 according to Hamilton and Ruta [2006]. Multiplying the
(all types of) capital share in income αwc by the share of reproducible capital in all types
of capital we obtain an estimate of the reproducible capital share in income αkc. Using
the specification in equation 1.13 I obtain the results reported in table 1.8. As the last
row shows, adding the estimate of capital share from Caselli and Feyrer [2007] I obtain
a number suggesting perfect equalization in the returns to physical reproducible capital
between poor and rich countries28.
Table 1.8 Framework 7: Caselli capital shares
Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries N
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 142
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 141
F3 + Health capital 2.6 141
F5 + Imperfect substitution 2.2 141
F6 + Bernanke capital shares 21.8 53
F7 + Caselli capital shares 1.0 53
A possible issue here is the smaller sample of countries with respect to the previous
27See Appendix A for a detailed description of the different types of capital and how they are estimated.
28By the way, in a world of perfect capital markets, perfect equalization is what economic theory say
should happen.
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frameworks29. To check if sample selection is what drives the result I replicate all calcula-
tions done so far using only those countries for which there is an estimate of reproducible
capital share in Caselli and Feyrer [2007] 30. Results are reported in table 1.9 and confirm
that return equalization is not driven by sample issues.
Table 1.9 Ratio of MPK poor/rich countries: check samples
All countries Only F7 sample (53)
F1 Basic calibration 6.6 5.4
F2 + Schooling capital 2.8 4.1
F3 + Health capital 2.6 3.8
F5 + Imperfect substitution 2.2 3.4
F6 + Bernanke capital shares 21.8 21.8
F7 + Caselli capital shares 1.0 1.0
Figure 1.15 Relationship between MPK and GDP per worker under frame-
work 1 (basic calibration) and 7 (Caselli capital share)
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Figure 1.15 compares the relationship between MPK and GDP per worker under the
basic calibration of MPK I started from (framework 1) and the last calibration of MPK
29The same concern emerged in framework 4 when I introduced test score results to control for quality
of schooling/parenting
30A total of 53 countries
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that controls for human and health capital, imperfect substitutability of workers with
different skills and country-specific reproducible capital shares. The relationship is strongly
negative in the left side graph, where capital per worker ratio is the driving force of capital
return differential. The same relationship is a flat line (maybe, interestingly, positive?) in
the right side graph, once I take into account a bunch of other elements that seems, at the
end of this analysis, determinants of capital returns as important as the standard capital
per worker measure.
1.7 Summing up chapter 1
This chapter shows that a simple calibration approach that correct for differences in
human capital and in the capital share of output can deliver as a result the equalization
of the returns to physical capital between rich and poor countries. The main finding of
this chapter is consistent with the empirical evidence presented at the beginning: capital
flows are quite a small fraction of World GDP when compared to the differences in capital
per worker we observe between rich and poor countries.
My calibration exercise suggests that the relative small capital flows observed in data
are not the result of international financial market frictions, they are instead the result of
scarce differences in the productivity of physical capital, when this productivity is properly
measured. Similar productivities of physical capital across countries implies that, even if
capital could move relatively freely across countries, it wouldn’t.
The result basically originates from taking into account differences across countries in
the share of physical capital on output and in the quality of labor, the factor of production
complementary to physical capital. Each new unit of physical capital have to be used by
workers, and workers’ characteristics change a lot across countries. In this chapter I take
into account some of the characteristics that the literature sees as crucial in determining
workers’ productivity like the quantity and quality of their education, their health status
or their degree of substitutability.
One might object that there are other characteristics of a country not taken into
account here that can certainly influence capital movements across countries. The quality
of institutions is the first that comes to mind. Countries with better institutions - e.g. low
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risk of expropriation, financial stability, property rights protection - are certainly more
likely to receive foreign capital even if their capital to labor ratio is high. This is the case
for example of US and Europe. However, better institutions are positively correlated with
higher educational attendance of workers, better schools and better hospitals. In other
words, countries where workers on average go to school for more years, are assisted by
better teachers and are more healthy, usually are countries with better institution. In a
way, the measure of physical capital productivity I propose here already takes institutional
quality into account through all a set of dimensions that are crucially affected by it.
It is a simple - but nonetheless interesting - result, that, once one takes into account
these dimensions, all the arbitrage opportunities that we thought could have been there,
suddenly disappear.
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Chapter 2
Misallocation and TFP in the
Manufacturing Sector:
the case of Chile and Mexico in
the 1980s
In this chapter I measure the potential effect of misallocation on manufacturing TFP in
Chile and Mexico during 1980s applying the methodology proposed by Hsieh and Klenow
[2009]. My results suggest that in Chile capital and labor were more efficiently allocated
across manufacturing firms with respect to Mexico during that period. I estimate poten-
tial gains in aggregate manufacturing TFP from moving Mexico to the level of efficiency
observed in Chile to be up to 11% in the mid-1980s. This new fact could help explain the
different paths of recovery experienced by these two countries after the crisis of 1982. I
also find suggesting evidence that sectors where firms depend more from external finance
show less misallocation.
2.1 Aim and main results of the chapter
We suspect that a relevant part of TFP differences across countries is related to how
countries allocate factors of production across firms. Hsieh and Klenow [2009] estimate
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potential manufacturing TFP gains of 30-50% in China and 40-60% in India deriving by
the reallocation of capital and labor across firms to the level of efficiency observed in the
United States.
In this chapter I apply their methodology to plant level data of Chile and Mexico
during 1980s. The case study I propose try to shed new light on why, in the aftermath of
the severe crisis that hit Latin America in 1982-83, Chile recovered quickly why Mexico
stagnated until the mid-1990s. Bergoeing et al. [2002] document how different patterns
of recovery were mainly due to different patterns of TFP growth. They claim that a key
explanation behind TFP growth in Chile are the structural reform undertaken by the
Chilean government in the early 1980s. In particular: the reform of the banking sector
implemented at different stages between 1982 and 1986, and the reform of the bankruptcy
law of 1982. The former made credit allocation across firms be driven mostly by the
market, and not by the government. The latter speeded up the bankruptcy procedure,
avoiding the use of subsidies by government and making easier for less efficient firms to
exit the market.
The results of this chapter are consistent with the ”structural reforms boosting TFP”
story, and show how Chile did a better job allocating resources across its manufacturing
firms during that period. I estimate potential gains in aggregate manufacturing TFP
from moving Mexico to the level of efficiency observed in Chile to be up to 11%. In
addition, I find a strong negative relationship between dependence on external credit and
misallocation. This suggests that the implementation of a credit market reform that allows
a larger fraction of credit to be assigned on the grounds of firms’ productivity (and not
on political ties) like the one undertaken in Chile in the early 1980s, could have reduced
misallocation across firms by assigning more credit to more productive firms and letting
the less productive go bankrupt.
To perform the empirical exercise I use plant level data collected by national statistical
offices. The same type of data used by Hsieh and Klenow [2009] are available in these
two datasets so that I am able to perform a consistent replication of their exercise in a
different framework.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 presents a short description of
the model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms taken from Hsieh and
40
Klenow [2009] where heterogeneity in firm level productivity is due to output and capital
distortions; Section 2.3 describes the datasets used for Chile and Mexico; Section 2.4
presents the main empirical results on misallocation; Section 2.5 shows suggestive evidence
of the role of reforms in decreasing misallocation; Section 2.6 concludes. A series of
robustness checks performed on the main results is reported in the Appendix.
2.2 Model from Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
Hsieh and Klenow [2009] propose a model where distortions at firm level (like firm
specific taxes or subsidies) can lower TFP at aggregate level. They design firm specific
distortions as wedges between factor returns and factor payments. In their setting ef-
ficiency requires equalization of marginal products of factors across firms in the same
sector. Should distortions non homogeneously hit all firms operating in the same sector,
the marginal products of factors of these firms will not equalize, creating a misallocation
of resources.1 It is worth notice that they assume there are no distortions on the labor
market:2 the only types of distortions that can affect marginal products are those affecting
capital or output.
Given the lack of plant-specific price deflator the model uses revenue measures of
marginal products and productivities.3. As equation 2.1 shows, if marginal revenue prod-
ucts of factors are equalized, then also revenue total factor productivities (TFPRsi, where
i identify the single firm and s the industrial sector) are equalized across firms in each
sector.
TFPRsi ∝ (MRPKsi)αs(MRPLsi)1−αs ∝ (1 + τKsi)
αs
(1− τYsi)
(2.1)
Equation 2.1 also shows that high TFPRsi is a symptom of high distortions faced by the
1As an example take two firms operating in the same sector (i.e. using the same production function)
that are equally productive and assume that one of them can borrow at a preferential rate, maybe because
of its political connections. Both firms will invest until their marginal product of capital equalize the
interest rate they face. Since the firm with political connections will enjoy a lower interest rate, the
marginal products of the two firms will differ, and the allocation of resources will be inefficient.
2Labor is free to flow across sectors, the marginal product of labor is the same in all sectors and is set
equal to 1. How realistic this assumption is will be checked in Section ??.
3The main issue of prices is to disentangle their productivity component (marginal cost) from their
market power component (markups). This issue will be further discussed in the robustness check in
Section (??)
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firm (τYsi and τKsi are, respectively, output and capital distortions
4). More distorted firms
can not reach their efficient size and, therefore, have higher marginal products of capital
and labor.
At sectoral level, firm specific TFPRsi are aggregated using equation (2.2)
TFPs =
(
Ms∑
i=1
{
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
}σ−1) 1σ−1
(2.2)
where Asi stands for firm specific physical total factor productivity, TFPRs is an in-
dustry mean of TFPRsi, Ms is the number of firms operating in sector s and σ is the
elasticity of substitution5. Equation 2.2 has the following implications: (i) each firm con-
tribution to sectoral TFP depends positively from its physical TFP and negatively from
its revenue TFP , this in turns implies that (ii) each firm contribution to sectoral TFP is
higher the lower the distortions faced, and (iii) if marginal products, and, consequently,
TFPRsi, were equalized across plants in the same sector, TFPs would be equal to its
efficient counterpart A¯s =
(∑Ms
i=1A
σ−1
si
) 1
σ−1 .
Finally, aggregate output is defined in the Hsieh and Klenow [2009] model as in equa-
tion (2.3):
Y =
S∏
s=1
Y θss =
S∏
s=1
(TFPsKαss L
1−αs
s )
θs (2.3)
where θs is the weight given to each sector’s contribution to total output and is calcu-
lated as the value added share of each sector on total value added.
Using equation (2.3) it is possible to write an expression of TFP at country level as a
Cobb-Douglas aggregation of sectoral TFP s:
TFP =
S∏
s=1
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] θsσ−1
(2.4)
What Klenow and Hsieh measure is the potential percentage growth in manufacturing
output that would occur if we could get rid of output and capital distortions (∆Y =
4Hsieh and Klenow [2009] define distortions that increase marginal products of the two factors by the
same proportion as output distortions, and distortions that increase marginal product of capital relative
to labor as capital distortions.
5Following Hsieh and Klenow [2009] σ is set equal to 3.
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(
Y ∗−Y
Y
)
, where Y is the actual manufacturing output and Y ∗ is its efficient counterpart).
The potential output growth is nothing but the percentage gain in TFP obtained by
equalizing TFPRsi across firms inside each sector, therefore ∆Y = ∆TFP .
Using equation (2.4) it is possible to write the potential percentage gain in TFP in
each country as:
∆TFP =
(
TFP ∗
TFP
− 1
)
=
 S∏
s=1
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
A¯s
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1]−θsσ−1
− 1
 = ∆Y (2.5)
Equation (2.5) is the key equation of this empirical work. In order to estimate equation
(2.5) a measure of physical productivity (Asi, or TFPQsi, meaning quantity total factor
productivity) and a measure of revenue productivity (TFPRsi) are needed for each firm.
These two measures are defined exactly as in Hsieh and Klenow [2009].
TFPRsi =
PsiYsi
(Kαssi )(wLsi)1−αs
(2.6)
Where Ksi and wLsi are respectively capital and the wage bill at firm level, PsiYsi is
total revenues of the firm, αs is capital share in sector s calculated using US data6.
Solving the model it is possible to express physical productivity Asi as:
Asi =
Ysi
(Kαssi )(wLsi)1−αs
=
w1−α(PsYs)−
1
σ−1
Ps
(PsiYsi)
σ
σ−1
(Kαssi )(wLsi)1−αs
(2.7)
The point here is that, since the focus is on firm-specific relative productivities with
respect to sectoral means, once those variables that are common to all firms in a sector
are normalized (i.e. setting the expression in equation (2.7) w1−α(PsYs)−
1
σ−1 /Ps = 1) it
is possible to express:
TFPQsi ≡ Asi = (PsiYsi)
σ
σ−1
(Kαssi )(wLsi)1−αs
(2.8)
With these equations in hand what is needed is, for each firm, data on value added,
capital stock and wage bill.
6data on factor shares at sector level are from the NBER Productivity Database. I adjusted the value
of each industry labor share scaling up by 3/2 as in Hsieh and Klenow [2009] to take into account non-wage
forms of compensation
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2.3 Plant-level data for Chile and Mexico
The data for Chile are from Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual (ENIA) carried
out annually by the Chilean Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). The data set is
an unbalanced panel including an average of 4,672 plant observation per year from 1979
to 1996. The survey covers all manufacturing plants in the country with at least 10
workers. Many variables in the original data set were recorded in nominal terms and have
been transformed in constant 1980 prices using appropriate price deflators for output,
intermediate materials, energy and capital goods. For a complete description of the data
cleaning process the reference is Roberts et al. [1996]. The information I use from the
Chilean data are the plant’s four-digit industrial sector of production,7 value added, labor
compensation and total capital stock net of depreciation. Labor compensation is the sum
of wages and non-wage compensations such as gifts, supports and charges. As for capital
stock, it is calculated as the sum of the book value of fixed assets (machineries, buildings,
transportations, other) at their end of year value net of specific depreciation
The raw data for Mexico are from a survey of manufacturing plants collected by Mex-
ico’s Instituto Nacional de Estadisitica y Geografia (INEGI). The original sample provided
a balanced panel of 3,218 plant observations per year from 1984 to 19908. The comple-
tion of the questionnaire is compulsory and only for statistical purpose (meaning it is not
linked to tax collection). The survey attempts to cover the three fourths of value added
in manufacturing, raising the issue of a selection bias towards larger and more profitable
firms9. I will discuss how some of the results of this chapter could be affected by this bias.
The main variables of the INEGI database that I used are again the plant’s four-digit
industrial sector,10 value added, capital stock and labor compensation. All monetary vari-
ables are deflated using appropriate price deflators: for inputs there are more general price
indices while gross value of products is deflated using four digit precision. The measure
7INE classify industries according to the ISIC rev.2 code
8Each observation is a single plant, I will use the working hypothesis that all plants are single establish-
ment firms. For a detailed description of the data cleaning process of the original database the reference
is Tybout and Westbrook [1995]
9It has to be noticed also that, in order to have a balanced panel, exiting plants are excluded from the
survey by INEGI.
10The industrial sectors in the INEGI database are classified according to the 1975 Mexican Censo
Industrial. I converted this code into the ISIC rev.2 code to make it comparable with the other two
countries.
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of value added is calculated subtracting the cost of material and energy inputs by the
real gross value of output (both deflated by mid-year price index) and it is corrected by
maquila related flows11. Labor compensation is the sum of wages, benefits, social security
contributions and profit sharing. The capital stock is the sum of all types of fixed capital
(machinery, buildings, land, transport equipment and other assets) valued at end of year
replacement cost and deflated by the appropriate end of year price indices.
In both countries I dropped all plant-year observations with the following character-
istics: (1) missing or negative values in plant’s value added, capital stock or labor remu-
neration; (2) reporting less than 10 employees; (3) operating in an industrial sector with
no US correspondence in the NBER productivity database, and therefore for which it was
impossible to back out factor shares; (4) having physical (TFPQsi) or revenue (TFPRsi)
total factor productivities (after demeaning and taking logs) either in the top or in the
bottom 1% of all plants in each country.
2.4 Chile and Mexico distributions of physical and revenue
productivities across firms
Figure (2.1) shows the distribution of physical productivity (TFPQsi) at firm level in
Chile (straight line) and Mexico (dashed line), data refers to 1986. Mexico shows a thicker
left tail in TFPQsi distribution, suggesting that, in the aftermath of the crisis, there is a
bigger mass of less efficient plant operating in the market with respect to Chile. Notice
that if there was no selection problem of successful plants in Mexico this result would
probably be even stronger.
Figure (2.2) shows the distribution of TFPRsi in Chile (straight line) and Mexico
(dashed line), data again refers to 1986. According to the model presented in Section (2.2),
the more TFPRsi is dispersed, the more distortions drive factor allocation in a country.
The higher peak at zero reported in Figure (2.2) suggests that Chilean firms are more
concentrated around their industry means in terms of revenue total factor productivities,
11Maquilas are factories that import materials and equipment on a duty-free and tariff-free regime for
assembly or manufacturing and then re-exports the assembled product, usually to the original country.
For each plant I added income and subtracted costs deriving from maquila services since these data are
reported in the record of the plant asking for the subcontracted work and of the plant that is actually
doing it
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and therefore that their marginal products are less apart than those of Mexican firms
inside each sector.
Figure 2.1 Distribution of physical productivity (TFPQ)
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Figure 2.2 Distribution of revenue productivity (TFPR)
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Figure (2.3) shows the evolution over time of the dispersion in TFPRsi, measured by
the standard deviation of log(TFPRsi) around industry means. TFPRsi dispersion has
decreased in Chile from 1979 to 1990, while it has been stable or, if anything, increased,
in Mexico during the 1980s.
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Figure 2.3 Evolution over time of misallocation measured as dispersion
(st.dev.) in revenue productivity
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Note: Statistics are for deviations of log(TFPRsi) from industry means.
This decade of 1980s has been characterized in the majority of Latin American coun-
tries by the economic crisis of 1982-83. Between 1982 and 1983 GDP per capita fell by
almost 12% in Chile and 7% in Mexico. If the crisis hit hard both countries, the recovery
followed very different paths. Chile recovered rapidly: in 1986 real GDP per capita was
already back at the pre-crisis level. Mexico did not recover for a long time: real GDP per
capita stagnated during all the 1980s and only in 1998 real GDP per capita was back at
the level of 1981. Bergoeing et al. [2002] revise different possible explanations of why the
1980s was a ”lost decade” for Mexico and one of spectacular recovery for Chile. They find
that different patterns of recovery were mainly due to different patterns of TFP growth
(see Figure (2.5). The structural reforms undertaken by Chile in the early 1980s, in partic-
ular those affecting banking and the bankruptcy procedures, are, according to Bergoeing
et al. [2002], the main explanation behind the sustained growth in TFP observed in Chile,
and its consequent rapid recovery. On the other hand Mexico undertook a set of reforms
only from the mid-1980s or later and, even after that, was unable to fully recover.
The numbers showed in this chapter are consistent with the effectiveness of structural
reforms in Chile in preparing the ground for a rapid recovery after the crisis. The growth
in GDP per capita observed in Chile from 1984 onwards seems associated with a decreas-
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ing misallocation across Chilean manufacturing firms. In the next section I will provide
new evidence linking the dependence on external finance to lower misallocation, and the
consequent positive effect that the banking and bankruptcy reforms could have had on
Chilean manufacturing aggregate TFP.
Figure 2.4 GDP per capita in Chile and Mexico 1980 - 1990
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Figure 2.5 Evolution over time of TFP in Chile and Mexico
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To calculate a capital stock series, we cumulate investment, I , usingt
K ! 1" ! K # I 3Ž . Ž .t#1 t t
for some chosen depreciation rate ! and an initial condition on capital.
We use a depreciation rate !! 0.05 for both countries, and, for the initial
condition on capital, we assume the capital"output ratio grew from 1960 to
1961 by the same amount that it did over the period 1961"1970. As a
check, we note that with these choices the share of capital consumption in
GDP, which in the model is measured by !K $Y , is equal to the numbert t
Ž .reported by the United Nations 1986 for Mexico in 1980. To reproduce
the corresponding number for Chile in 1980, we would need a higher
depreciation rate, !! 0.08. We choose to use !! 0.05 for two reasons.
First, we want to use the same production technology in our growth
accounting and numerical experiments for Chile as for Mexico. Second, a
higher value of ! for Chile yields implausibly low values of the capital"
Žoutput ratio there. We provide alternative growth accounting and numer-
ical experiments for a production technology in which !! 0.08 in
.Appendix B; the qualitative nature of our conclusions does not change.
Given our choice of # and generated series for K , we can calculatet
TFP series. Figure 13 plots the series for Mexico and Chile detrended by
1.4% per year. We detrend at this rate because in a balanced growth path,
where output and capital per worker grow by 2% per year, TFP would
have to grow by 1.4% per year, 1.021"0.3! 1.0140. What is striking about
Fig. 13 is how closely the TFP data match those for GDP per working-age
FIG. 13. Total factor productivity detrended by 1.4% per year.Note: Total factor productivity detrended by 1.4% a year, source: Bergoeing et al. [2002]
Table (2.1) compares TFPRsi dispersion in Chile and Mexico with the numbers re-
ported in Hsieh and Klenow [2009] for India, China and US. The table reports the year
closest to 1986 in each country. US (1987) shows by far the less dispersed distribution
of TFPRsi, with a standard deviation of 0.41, consistently with its role of benchmark
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country in terms of efficiency in the allocation of resources across firms. The other four
countries look more similar to each other, with Chile - that in 1986 report a standard
deviation in TFPRsi of 0.64 - showing not only less dispersion than Mexico (0.71 in 1986)
but also than India (0.69 in 1987) and China (0.74 in 1998).
Table 2.1 Measures of dispersion of TFPR across countries
country: Chile Mexico India China US
year: 1986 1986 1987 1998 1987
S.D. 0.64 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.41
75-25 0.76 0.90 0.79 0.97 0.41
90-10 1.57 1.77 1.73 1.87 1.01
N 2,189 2,476 31,602 95,980 173,651
Note: data for India, China and US are from Hsieh and Klenow [2009]
What would happen to Mexican manufacturing TFP if resources where to be allocated
across firms as efficiently as in Chile during the 1980s? To answer this question I follow
the Hsieh and Klenow [2009] methodology. First I compute the hypothetical efficient man-
ufacturing output - the output that would be produced if all firms had the same TFPRsi
- in the two countries for each year. Then I take the ratio of the efficient versus actual
output (Y ∗/Y ). Finally I divide the ratio calculated for Mexico by the ratio calculated for
Chile. The results are reported in Table (2.2). By virtually moving to the Chilean level of
efficiency in resource allocation across manufacturing firms Mexican manufacturing TFP
could have boosted on average by 8.5% between 1984 to 1990, with a minimum of 2.4%
in 1984 and a maximum of 11.4 in 1987.
Table 2.2 TFP gains relative to Chile
Mexico 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 sample avg
% TFP gain 2.4 6.7 10 7.8 11.4 10.5 10.6 8.5
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2.5 Dependence on external finance and misallocation
In this section I present suggesting evidence of a link between the dependence on
external finance and misallocation. The aim is to check whether structural reforms, such as
those of the banking system and bankruptcy law, can help explain the lower misallocation
observed in Chile after the crisis. Bank reform was aimed at liberalizing the credit market.
During the crisis insolvent bank were liquidated while solvent banks were re-privatized
immediately after. The allocation of credit coming from this reformed system was based
on market interest rates and not (or less than before) on political links. This, along with
easier bankruptcy procedures, had consequences in terms of firm turnover. Less productive
firms that wasn’t able to match their returns on investment with the market interest rates
(that were high after the crisis) were more likely to exit than before the reform12. If firms
in the lower tail of the productivity distribution exit the market, dispersion and, therefore,
misallocation, should decrease. To test this hypothesis I use the variation between sectors
in terms of their dependence on external credit to finance investment. If inefficient firms
that rely mainly on their cash-flow can survive a strong credit tightening, inefficient firms
that relies mainly on external credit are less likely to stay in the market during a period
of high interest rates. I use as dependent variable the measure of dependence on external
finance by Rajan and Zingales [1998]. The higher the Rajan and Zingales measure is
in a given sector and country, the more that sector in that country depends on external
financing to invest and produce. My claim is that misallocation, measured as dispersion in
TFPRsi within sectors, should be lower in sectors that depend more on external finance,
because in those sectors less efficient firms are less likely to survive. Table (2.3) report
the results of regressing the standard deviation in log(TFPRsi)) at sectoral level on the
measure of dependence on external finance proposed by Rajan and Zingales in a pooled
sample of Chilean and Mexican firms. The coefficient is negative and remains strongly
significant when I add time, country and industry fixed effects.
12On the other hand the Mexican banking system was still highly regulated, preferred industries were
protected by government that lent at lower-then-market interest rates.
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Table 2.3 Regression of misallocation on dependence on external finance,
pooled regression
(1) (2)
st.dev.(log(TFPRsi))s
fin dep -0.112*** -0.0963***
(0.0283) (0.0309)
country fixed effects no yes
year fixed effects no yes
industry fixed effects no yes
Constant 0.681*** 0.756***
(0.0127) (0.0302)
Observations 440 440
R2 0.048 0.409
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
2.6 Summing up chapter 2
The main goal of this chapter is to perform a cross country comparison applying the
misallocation approach proposed by Hsieh and Klenow [2009] to plant level data of Chile
and Mexico during the 1980s. My results suggest that there are less distortions operating
on average in the Chilean manufacturing sector with respect to the Mexican one. A
plausible explanation is the set of liberalization reforms undertaken in Chile in the early
1980s. I estimate potential gains in aggregate manufacturing TFP to be up to 11% in
Mexico if it was to move overnight to the level of efficiency observed in Chile in the 1980s.
These results are robust to changes in variables and parameters’ values, as described in
the robustness checks performed in the Appendix.
The misallocation approach is motivated by the heterogeneity observed at firm level,
even between firms that produce very similar product, and read this heterogeneity as a
symptom of misallocation. I think that areas for future research in this framework are
the investigation of sources of heterogeneity that differ in intensity between developed and
developing countries and the policy implications deriving from this analysis.
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In section (2.5) I propose a possible source of heterogeneity: efficiency of financial
markets in allocating credit to firms. In terms of policy implication, the link between
external financial dependence and misallocation suggests that policy reforms that deal
with credit market failures can have a significant impact on aggregate outcomes.
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Conclusions
This Thesis provides new evidence on the relationship between the allocation of factors
of production and differences in productivity across economic agents. The two chapters
deal with this issue from two different perspectives, and have to be read as two separate
papers.
In the first chapter I focus on the allocation of physical capital across countries. In a
textbook neoclassical framework the allocation of physical capital per worker affects its
productivity. All other things equal, the lower is the ratio of physical capital per worker
in a country, the higher is the return of the next unit of physical capital invested in that
country. Along the first chapter I assume equal TFP across countries. The aim is to check
whether we can explain the small flows of capital across countries by properly taking
into account the allocation of factors of production, namely capital and labor, instead of
appealing to important TFP differences. Clearly, in this framework, how one measures
capital and labor is crucial for the result. I use a standard measure of returns to physical
capital that takes into account differences in human capital and in the physical capital
share on output across countries. Applying this calibration approach to new data I show
that once returns to physical capital are computed with a more accurate measure, the
allocation of physical capital is one in which returns are close to be equalized between rich
and poor countries.
The main finding of the first chapter -i.e. very similar returns to physical capital in rich
and poor countries - is consistent with the relatively small capital flows observed in data.
The result also suggests that the current allocation of physical capital per worker across
countries is not driven by distortions such as international financial market frictions. It is
instead the result of scarce differences in the productivity of physical capital, when this
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productivity is properly measured.
The second chapter instead focuses on the allocation of capital and labor across firms.
Here I investigate whether a more efficient allocation of factors across firms can affect
productivity at country level.
I perform a cross country comparison applying the misallocation approach proposed
by Hsieh and Klenow [2009] to plant level data of Chile and Mexico during the 1980s.
The results suggest that there are less distortions operating on average in the Chilean
manufacturing sector with respect to the Mexican one. I estimate potential gains in
aggregate manufacturing TFP to be up to 11% in Mexico if factors of production were
reshuﬄed across firms to the level of efficiency observed in Chile in the mid-1980s.
At the end of the second chapter I propose a possible story for the more efficient al-
location observed in Chile with respect to Mexico: the implementation by the Chilean
government of the banking system reform and of the new bankruptcy law. To support the
potential importance of this channel, I present empirical evidence suggesting that misal-
location is lower in sectors that depend more on external finance. This could be because
less efficient firms are more likely to exit when they operate in sectors that structurally
relies more on external credit13. When less efficient firms exit the market, the factors
of production they free are redistributed among the more efficient firms that stay in the
market. Reforms such those carried out in Chile in the wake of the crisis favor an allo-
cation of credit based more on actual productivity than on political links. Such reforms
can therefore help explain the lower dispersion observed across Chilean firms in terms of
productivity in the mid-1980s and the fast recovery experienced by Chile with respect to
Mexico in that decade.
Establishing a link between external financial dependence and misallocation has im-
portant policy implications. It suggests that there is scope for policy reforms14 to help
the recovery of a country by favoring the reallocation of the available resources from less
to more productive firms. Something that could turn out to be useful in the next future
also in Europe.
13This is even more true in a period of crisis
14In particular those addressed to deal with important market failures such as those observed in the
credit market
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1:
Description of the Database
This appendix 1 describes all variables contained in the database used in the com-
putation carried out in the first chapter. It is divided into 4 sections: the first section
describes basic data on national accounts (e.g. GDP, capital stock, number of workers),
the second section describes variables related to quantity of education (e.g. attainment
ratios, duration, years of schooling and Mincerian coefficients), the third section describes
variables related to quality of educationl (e.g. pupil-teacher ratios, public spending in
education, test scores), the fourth section describes variables related to different types of
capital (produced versus natural capital).
The database includes 142 countries with complete data for GDP, capital stock esti-
mates and years of schooling in 1995 and 2005.
A.1 Basic data on national accounts
A.1.1 GDP
There are two variables for Y according to the data source used.
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A.1.1.1 GDP from WDI 2009 (Y wdi)
Y from World Development Indicators 2009 (hereafter WDI(2009)) is GDP in 2005
international dollars, i.e. in PPP. The PPP adjustment is made using the last International
Comparison Program (ICP, 2005 round). Among the 142 countries in the dataset there
are 7 countries in 1995 (Afghanistan, Barbados, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Taiwan) and 3
countries in 2005 (Cuba, Iraq, Taiwan) for which Y is not available in WDI(2009).
A.1.1.2 GDP from Penn World Tables 6.3 (Y pwt)
Y from Penn World Tables version 6.3 (hereafter PWT63) is constructed using the
following variables from the original PWT63 dataset: real GDP per capita (constant
prices: chain series) (RGDPCH ) and population (in thousands) (POP). Therefore Y pwt =
rgdpch ∗ pop ∗ 1000. Notice that in PWT63 ”real” means ”PPP converted”, but it does
not incorporate the 2005 ICP. Y pwt is available for all the 142 countries in the dataset
for both 1995 and 2005.
A.1.1.3 Main differences between Y wdi and Y pwt
The main difference between these two estimates is in the way the purchasing power
parity (PPP) deflator is constructed. The PPP adjustment in WDI (2009) is made with
ICP data. The ICP uses the EKS method (Elteto, Koves, and Szulc) to construct ag-
gregated PPPs for GDP and its major aggregates (consumption, investment, government
consumption) between countries within a region1, and then a ring comparison to make
regional results comparable on a global scale. The EKS method has two important char-
acteristics: first, it is not additive; second, it uses an implicit weighting that is equal
across countries. On the other hand the PPP adjustment in PWT 6.3 is made using
the Gheary-Khamis (GK) methodology. This methodology tends to inflate the income of
poor countries relative to rich countries, and this is due to the weighting system used to
construct the international price of each item (e.g. food). The weights used are the expen-
ditures of each country (converted to the currency of a numeraire country) in that item.
This implies that the international price of an item like food, to which is devoted a larger
1EKS method was used in all regions other than Africa (Ikle’ method)
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share of expenditure in poor countries, will be closer to the price of food in rich countries.
Since food is more expensive in rich countries, their price will receive an higher weight
with respect to the poor countries’ price, and when the international price constructed
in this way is multiplied by the large quantities of food consumed by poor countries to
construct the GDP in PPP, the GDP in PPP of poor countries will be ”overestimated”.
As a result, if we compare the distribution of GDP per worker obtained with EKS and
GK methods, the distribution obtained with the EKS method is larger and fatter in the
left tail, while the right tail is much closer to the one you obtain with GK method.
Figure A.1 Distribution of GDP per worker across countries using WDI or
PWT
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A.1.2 Capital Stock (K)
Estimates of the capital stock are constructed using the perpetual inventory method.
I applied the standard capital accumulation equation:
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1
where Kt is the capital stock, It is investment and δ the yearly depreciation rate of
capital.
The series of It, real aggregate investment in PPP, is constructed using data from
PWT63. The series of It from PWT63 is generated multiplying the investment share
of real GDP per capita (KI ) by the real GDP per capita (constant prices: Laspeyeres)
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(RGDPL)2.
The initial capital stock (K0) is constructed as in Caselli (2005) as I0/(g + δ) where
I0 is the value of investment in the initial year, δ is the yearly depreciation rate of capital
set to 0.06 and g is:
(i) avg growth rate between the first year available and 1970 for those countries whose
series of It starts before 1970 (100 countries)
(ii) avg growth rate during the first 10 years of the It series starting from the first year
available for those countries whose series of It starts after 1970 (42 countries)
The following table sum up the number of countries by initial year of the It (and
therefore Kt) series (the dataset includes a variable named ini year k that reports the
initial year of the It series for each country).
ini_year_K | Freq. Percent Cum.
------------+-----------------------------------
1950 | 51 35.92 35.92
1951 | 6 4.23 40.14
1952 | 1 0.70 40.85
1953 | 2 1.41 42.25
1954 | 3 2.11 44.37
1955 | 4 2.82 47.18
1959 | 2 1.41 48.59
1960 | 29 20.42 69.01
1961 | 2 1.41 70.42
1970 | 28 19.72 90.14
1987 | 1 0.70 90.85
1989 | 1 0.70 91.55
1990 | 4 2.82 94.37
1992 | 1 0.70 95.07
1993 | 6 4.23 99.30
1995 | 1 0.70 100.00
------------+-----------------------------------
Total | 142 100.00
2The formula I use is KI ∗RGDPL ∗ POP ∗ 1000, since population is in thousands.
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A.1.3 Population (POP )
The variable population from WDI(2009) is an estimate made by the World Bank for
mid-year population which counts ”all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship”.
For Taiwan there is no available estimate of population in WDI(2009) so I used data from
PWT63 and I constructed POP as: POP*1000 (since population is in thousands in the
original dataset).
A.1.4 Number of workers (L)
The number of workers is from WDI(2009) and the variable in the original dataset is
called ”Labor force, total”. According to World Bank definition ”Labor force comprises
people who meet the ILO definition of the economically active population: all people
who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. It
includes both the employed and unemployed”. For Taiwan there is no available esti-
mate of labor force in WDI(2009) so I used data from PWT63 and I constructed L as:
(RGDPCH*POP*1000)/RGDPWOK.
A.1.5 Current Account (CA)
Current Account data are from WDI(2009). The original variable I used is current
account as a share of GDP, this variable is expressed in current local currency units (LCU).
To transform it in PPP international dollars I multiplied it by the GDP current LCU and
divided the result by the PPP conversion (LCU per current international dollar). Since
I wanted CA to be expressed as a GDP share I then divided by GDP in PPP current
international dollars. Since most of the calculation are performed for the year 2005,
current international dollars correspond to 2005 international dollars. It has to be taken
into account, however, that the PPP conversion factor used in WDI is not the same as the
one used in the PWT63.
A.1.6 FDI
Data on FDI are from the WDI (2009) that use as sources: International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, World Bank,
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Global Development Finance, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. Foreign direct
investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series is
calculated as net outflows (flows to the rest of the world) minus net inflows (new investment
inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided
by GDP. A positive number means that the country is a net exporter of private capital
to the rest of the world, a negative number means that the country is a net importer of
private capital from the rest of the world.
The original variable I used is FDI as a share of GDP, where GDP is expressed in
current local currency units (LCU). To transform it in PPP international dollars I mul-
tiplied it by the GDP current LCU and divided the result by the PPP conversion (LCU
per current international dollar). Since I want fdi to be expressed as a GDP share I then
divided by GDP in PPP current international dollars. Since most of the calculation are
performed for the year 2005, current international dollars correspond to 2005 international
dollars. It has to be taken into account, however, that the PPP conversion factor used in
WDI is not the same as the one used in the PWT63.
A.1.7 Adult survival rate (sr)
To construct the adult survival rate I used data from WDI (2009), in particular: female
and male adult mortality rate and female and male shares in total population. Adult
mortality rate is the probability of dying between the ages of 15 and 60–that is, the
probability of a 15-year-old dying before reaching age 60, if subject to current age-specific
mortality rates between those ages. To create the adult survival rate I weighted the
mortality rate out of 1,000 persons of each sex by the share of each sex in total population
and then compute the survival rate as 1 minus the weighted mortality rate of adults. Note
that for 1995 I used the mortality rate of female and male for 1998, due to the large
number of missing in 1995.
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A.1.8 Prices (py pc pi pg )
Prices of gross domestic product, consumption, investment and government consump-
tion are from PWT63. Price level of GDP and each of its components are the relative PPP
divided by the exchange rate and multiplied by 100. The PPP of GDP or any component
is the national currency value divided by the real value in international dollars. The PPP
and the exchange rate are both expressed as national currency units per US dollar. This
implies that:
pi =
PPPi
EXRATE
∗ 100 i = y, c, i, g
The value of price of GDP (py) for the United States is made equal to 100, this is not true
for the component shares.
A.2 Quantity of Education
This section includes the following variables for years 1995 and 2005: educational
attainment ratios, duration in years of schooling of each education level, average years of
schooling, Mincerian coefficients.
A.2.1 Educational attainment ratios (lu, lp, lpc, dsi, ls, lsc, lh, lhc)
Data for educational attainment ratios are from Barro and Lee (2010)3. There are seven
categories of educational attainment: no education (lu), some primary education (lp),
completed primary education (lpc), some secondary education (ls), completed secondary
education (lsc), some higher education (lh), completed higher education (lhc). Each
educational attainment ratio is the share (in percentage points) of the adult population4
whose highest level of educational attainment is one these 7 categories. The share of
adult population who completed each level of education (primary, secondary, higher) is a
subgroup of the share of adult population that has at least some of each level of education
(e.g. this implies that people with completed primary are also included in the share of
population with some primary education).
3These data are available on line at http://www.barrolee.com/ last update: 2010.07.07
4Adult population includes people aged above 15, the subscript 1599 in each educational variable
indicate this age group
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A.2.2 Duration (dpi, dpc, dsi, dsc, dhi, dhc)
Data on duration of primary and secondary schooling are from WDI (2009) and refers
to 1995 and 2005, taking into account changes in the duration of each level of schooling over
time in a country. WDI (2009) does not have data on duration of higher education. Data on
duration of higher education are from Cohen Soto (2007)5 and from UNESCO. Countries
not covered by these sources are assigned the average duration of higher education of their
geographical region. For each level of education the fraction of population that does not
complete each level is assigned half the years of schooling of the full duration of that level.
A.2.3 Years of schooling (yr sch 1599)
Country average years of schooling is from Barro Lee (2010). For a detailed description
of how this variable is constructed please refer to section D of the Barro Lee paper.
A.2.4 Mincerian coefficients (mincoef , minyear, mincoef source)
The Mincerian coefficient is the coefficient on years of schooling in a log-wage regres-
sion6. For each country I collected up to 3 estimates of the mincerian coefficient at different
points in time:
1. mincoef0: mincerian coefficient estimated with data older than 1989 (62 observa-
tions)
2. mincoef1: mincerian coefficient estimated with data between 1989-1999 (70 obser-
vations)
3. mincoef2: mincerian coefficient estimated with data from 2000 onwards (31 obser-
vations)
For each coefficient I report the year it refers to (minyear0, minyear1 and minyear2)
and the source from which it is taken (mincoef0 source, mincoef1 source andmincoef2 source).
The source variable is a number, and each number correspond to one of the following pa-
pers:
5Available in Soto’s personal webpage http://www.iae-csic.uab.es/soto/data.htm
6in the most basic formulation wage is regressed on years of schooling, experience and experience
squared.
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• 1 : Psacharopoulos and Patrinos [2004]
• 2 : de la Fuente and Jimeno [2009]
• 3 : Bils and Klenow [2000]
• 4 : Kaboski [2007]
• 5 : Patrinos and Sakellariou [2006]
• 6 : Miller et al. [1995]
• 7 : Biagetti and Scicchitano [2009]
• 8 : Asadullah [2009]
• 9 : Lucas and Stark [1985]
• 10 : Psacharopoulos [1994]
• 11 : Patrinos [1995]
• 12 : Flabbi et al. [2008]
• 13 : Appleton [2000]
• 14 : Vujcic [2009]
• 15 : Cohn and Addison [1998]
• 16 : Brunelli Comi Lucifera [1999]
• 17 : Bart Roed [1999]
• 18 : Luo and Terada
• 19 : Rutkowski [1997]
• 20 : Keswell and Poswell [2004]
• 21 : Tunaer
• 22 : Appleton et al. [1998]
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• 23 : Mason and Khandker [1995]
• 24 : Appleton et al. [1999]
A.3 Quality of education
A.3.1 Pupil-Teacher Ratios (ptr)
1. We are interested in computing pupil-teacher ratios during the years when the aver-
age worker in each country attended primary and secondary school. Therefore, first
of all I constructed an estimate of the age of the average worker in each country.
To do that I followed these steps: (i) I take data from LABORSTA on economically
active population broken down in 5 years age intervals from 15-19 to 70-74 and on
the total economically active population aged above 15 years; (ii) for each group I
take the middle year of the age interval (e.g. 17 for the group aged [15-19]) and
weight it by the fraction of the economically active population in that interval with
respect to the total above 15 years; (iii) summing over the groups I get an estimate
of the average age of a worker in each country. Notice that I carry out this procedure
using the closest estimates provided by LABORSTA to 1995 and to 2005 in order to
take into account changes in the demography of the labor force during the 10 years
between the 2 observations. Among the 142 countries of the dataset it is possible to
construct this variable for 114 countries in both 1995 and 2005. The average age of
the average worker within our sample is 35.3 years in 1995 and 36.1 in 2005.
2. Then I compute the year at which the average worker starts primary and secondary
school in each country. As in Caselli (2005) I assume that children begin primary
schooling at the age of 6. The relevant year in which the average worker starts
primary school is computed as : 1995− age avgworker+ 6 for 1995 and as: 2005−
age avgworker+ 6 for 2005. I then compute the relevant year in which the average
worker starts secondary school using duration data on (completed) primary school:
1995− age avgworker + 6 + dpc for 1995 and as: 2005− age avgworker + 6 + dpc
for 2005.
3. Since pupil-teacher ratios and other education variables are collected at five years
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intervals I target the observation of the five years interval that is closest to the year in
which the average worker went to school. The target years in which average worker
went to primary school are (in parenthesis number of countries): 1960 (16), 1965
(67), 1970 (31) for 1995, and 1970 (31), 1975 (56) 1980 (27) for 2005. Target years
for secondary school are: 1965 (18), 1970 (50), 1975 (46) for 1995, 1975 (23), 1980
(55), 1985 (36) for 2005.
4. Data sources for pupil-teacher ratios for primary and secondary school are available
from 1970 onwards in WDI(2009) and for years 1960 and 1965 in Lee and Barro
(2001)7.
5. To construct a unique statistic for each country-year I weight pupil-teacher ratios in
primary and secondary school using new data from Barro and Lee (2010) on average
years of primary and secondary schooling attained in each country. These data are
available from 1960 onwards at 5 years intervals. The procedure is the same as in
Caselli (2005): weight each ratio by the fraction of schooling time the average worker
spent in primary and secondary schooling at the time he attended primary and sec-
ondary school. The formula I used to construct the final variable pupil teacher ratio
(ptr) is the following (the example refers to the average worker in 2005 who attended
primary in 1970 and secondary in 1975):
ptr2005 =
(
ptr(pri)1970 ∗ yrsch(pri)1970
yrsch(total)1970
)
+
(
ptr(sec)1975 ∗ yrsch(sec)1975
yrsch(total)1975
)
There are 88 observations for 1995 and 93 for 2005 for pupil teacher ratios (87 for
1996 in Caselli (2005)).
A.3.2 Public Spending in Education (expedu)
I construct this variable using the same data as in Caselli (2009). WDI(2009) provides
estimates on public education expenditure for primary and secondary school, and, for some
countries, also the shares of spending in teaching materials and teacher compensation.
However these data can be converted in PPP only from 1980. Since also for spending we
7I filled some missing values of pupil teacher ratios from 1970 onwards with data from Lee and Barro
(2001) when data is available in Lee and Barro (2001) and not in WDI (2009)
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focus on years when the average worker went to school, most of the observations we need
are before 1980. I have therefore used the Lee and Barro (2001) database who reports
real government current education expenditure per pupil in primary and secondary school
converted in PPP terms (1985 international dollars) starting from 1960. Dating and
weights for primary and secondary are the same as for pupil-teacher ratios. There are
64 observations in 1995 and 70 in 2005 for public spending in education (64 for 1996 in
Caselli (2005)).
A.3.3 Test Scores (timss matsci, pirls rea, pisa matsci, pisa rea)
Test scores data are from WDI (2009) and cover results from the following inter-
national programs: TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Studies),
PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) and PISA (Program for Inter-
national Student Assessment). The original score of TIMSS, PIRLS and PISA tests is in
a proficiency scale going from 0 to 1000, with an international average set at 500 and a
standard deviation of 100.
The database includes four variables on test scores:
1. The first is the average score over TIMSS mathematics and science test imparted
to 8th grande students. Rounds of these two tests have been carried out in 1995,
1999, 2003 and 2007 . The variable timss matsci is an average over the four rounds
rescaled on a range 0-1008. The number of countries covered is 37 in 1995, 35 in
1999, 42 in 2003 and 45 in 2007. Among the 142 countries of the database, 62 have
at least one observation in the TIMSS science test 9, and 61 of those10 have also at
least one observation in the TIMSS maths test11. There are no countries for which
are available the results of the TIMSS maths test and not of the TIMSS science test.
2. The second variable is the PIRLS test score in reading imparted to 8th grande
students (pirls rea). Data for this test are available only for 2006 and for 32 countries
8Note that test scores obtained in each country in different rounds are highly correlated
9The original variable in WDI (2009) is ”TIMSS: Mean performance on the science scale for eight grade
students, total”
10The only exception being Belgium, so for Belgium the variable only includes results of the TIMSS
science test.
11the original variable in WDI (2009) is ”TIMSS: Mean performance on the mathematics scale for eighth
grade students, total”
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among those in the database. Here again I rescaled test scores to 0-100.
3. The third variable is the average score over PISA mathematics and science test
(pisa matsci). PISA rounds have been carried out in 2000, 2003 and 2006. The
variable is an average over these three sessions rescaled to the range 0-100. There
are 54 countries for which data are available in all the three rounds (no country
participated only in one or two rounds).
4. The fourth variable is the PISA reading test score (pisa rea). Test scores are avail-
able for 2000, 2003 and 2006, I take the average score over the three rounds and
rescale it to the range 0-100. There are 54 countries for which data are available in
all the three rounds (no country participated only in one or two rounds).
A.4 Types of Capital
Data by type of capital are from Hamilton and Ruta [2006]. The World Bank provides
estimates at country level of produced capital, natural capital and intangible capital as a
residual (i.e. the difference between the total wealth of a country and the sum of produced
and natural capital). The World Bank data refer to year 2000 and cover 118 countries,
100 of which are also in the dataset presented here. I included in the dataset the estimates
of produced (producedplusurban) and natural capital (natcap) with their respective com-
ponents. Produced capital is the sum of machinery, equipment and structures (produced),
calculated with the perpetual inventory method, and urban land (urban), a fixed 24%
of produced capital. Natural capital is the sum of the estimated value of energy and
mineral resources (subsoil), timber resources (timber), nontimber forest resources (ntfr),
cropland (cropland), pastureland (pasture) and protected areas (pa). The Appendix A of
”Where is the wealth of nations?” World Bank (2006) provides details on the estimation
of all these variables.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2:
Robustness Checks
In this appendix I test the robustness of my results to changes in some key variables
and parameters’ values. The main concern is that the heterogeneity observed across firms,
and all the results in terms of misallocation deriving from that, could come from sources
other than distortions: measurement errors (that I check by using different set of variables
to see if main results hold) or variation in variables assumed to be fixed across firms like
wages, markups, elasticities of substitution, adjustment costs.
B.0.1 Alternative measures of capital
In the baseline version of this empirical exercise I used the book value of capital stock
as a proxy for capital used in production. A natural question is whether the value of
stocks like buildings, machineries, or transportation equipments is a good proxy for the
flow of capital services that is what the K that enters the production function actually
stands for, and that is certainly hardly observable. The main concern is that the book
value of capital stocks reported by firms could not capture the intensity with which this
capital is used in production. A natural alternative candidate for K is then the electricity
consumed by each firm. Electricity consumption has the following advantages: it takes
into account the intensity of capital used in production and allows to avoid the problem of
fixed costs of production, meaning how much of the capital is invested as a fixed cost and
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how much is invested in actual production. This alternative proxy has also drawbacks: old
capital could be more energy-consuming that new capital (while the second is probably
more effective); energy prices are subject to high volatility and appropriate price deflators
are essential; the amount of electricity consumed could in part be specific of the sector of
operation, so that in those sectors that consume more electricity one could overestimate
the role of capital (i.e. underestimate productivity) and vice versa. It is worth reminding
that both these proxies of K do not take into account any differentiation in quality of the
capital equipments.
Table B.1 TFP gains from equalizing TFPRsi within industries setting K=
energy consumption
Chile 1979 1983 1986
36.2 33.4 34.9
Mexico 1984 1986 1990
28.9 35.3 35.2
Table (B.1) reports aggregate TFP gains using energy consumption as a proxy for K.
For both Chile and Mexico aggregate TFP gains increase with respect to the baseline
version. This is especially true for Chile whose TFP gains are now 50% higher. This
is mainly due to the higher dispersion in energy consumption across Chilean firms with
respect to the book value of capital stock. The coefficient of variation1 over the whole
Chilean sample is 10.3 for energy consumption, two times higher than the coefficient of
variation for book value of capital stock (5.4).
B.0.2 Alternative measures of labor
All the results presented in the last section are obtained using the wage bill for the
factor of production L. The wage bill is often used to heroically take into account human
capital of workers, based on the idea that wages should reflect marginal products, and that
more trained workers are more productive. Clearly this measure also presents drawbacks.
1To compare the dispersion of the two proxies of capital I used the coefficient of variation, defined as
the ratio of the standard deviation σ to the mean µ.
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The first is that wages could not reflect the true marginal productivity of workers because
of distortions affecting the labor market, exactly as the prices of final goods or capital
goods could simply reflect distortions in goods or capital markets.2 Another problem
is that wages could reflect not simply the salary but also rent or profit sharing. This
implies I could have underestimated the dispersion of TFPRsi by using the wage bill for
L because more profitable plants might share more profits, and therefore they could be
more productive than they seem. A first natural alternative is to use the simple number of
workers. What I expect in this case is an increase in dispersion and therefore an increase
in potential gains from removing distortions. As Table (B.2) shows this is exactly what
happens.
Table B.2 TFP gains from equalizing TFPRsi within industries setting
L=number of employees
Chile 1979 1983 1986
42.1 48.4 45.7
Mexico 1984 1986 1990
(L=number of employees) 40.5 47.4 52.6
(L=hours worked) 40.4 48.4 48.8
Since workers not only differ in the quality of their work (something I tried to take
into account using the wage bill) but also in the number of hours they work per week,
another possible proxy for L is hours worked. The number of hours worked by employees
in each firm is available only for Mexico. As Table (B.2) shows, at least for Mexico, the
results do not change much with respect to when we use number of workers.
B.0.3 Wage variation
Hsieh and Klenow [2009] assume wages are equal for all firms and normalize w = 1 in
their model. However they do not test this hypothesis. In my dataset for Mexico I have
both real wage and hours worked per firm, so that I can construct a rough measure of the
hourly wage in each firm and then test whether variation in wages are associated or not
2This remains true in reality even if, following Hsieh and Klenow [2009] along this chapter I have
assumed all wages to be equal to 1 and distortions to affect only output and capital.
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with variation in TFPRsi. It is possible to write an expression for TFPRsi as:
TFPRsi =
σ
σ − 1
(
w
1− α
)1−α(R
α
)α (1 + τKsi)α
1− τYsi
(B.1)
According to this expression variations in TFPRsi within sectors could be due to varying
markups, varying factor prices, varying factor shares and, clearly, capital and output
distortions. Having assumed that factor shares do not vary within sectors, and not having
any available estimate for the price of capital what is left to test is wages and markups. As
Figure (B.1) shows, there is no clear relationship between TFPRsi and log hourly wages,
at least in Mexico. This implies that by assuming equal wages across sectors I am not
loosing any important cause of dispersion in TFPRsi.
Figure B.1 Relation between TFPRsi and log hourly wages in Mexico
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Note: data are for years 1984-1989, all plant-observations pooled together.
B.0.4 Varying markups with plant size
As I stated in the previous paragraph on wage variation, another source of variation
in TFPRsi could be variation in firm-specific markups. So far I assumed a CES function
such that all firms in all sectors (in all countries) will charge the same markup over their
marginal cost. However, if this assumption is clearly refused by data one could impute
the variance of TFPRsi to different markups charged by single firms.
Something I can check to verify this assumption is the relationship between size of a
firm and its TFPRsi. Theory suggests that smaller firms should face higher elasticity of
substitution for their goods, because they usually operate in very competitive markets.
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High elasticity of substitution implies low markups. If different markups play an important
role in explaining variations in TFPRsi we should observe a positive and clear relationship
between the size of a firm and its TFPRsi. An the other hand, if the hypothesis of constant
markups is not a crucial one, we should observe a flat line when checking this relationship.
Table (B.3) reports the results of regressing TFPR (in log deviation from sectoral means)
on firms’ size (measured as log value added) by size quartile. In both countries coefficients
on size are positive and significant in the first quartile. This means that for smallest firms
there is a somewhat positive relationship between size and TFPR. However, all coefficients
on size decrease and become insignificant as one looks at bigger firms. With few exceptions
(Chile showing a significant and positive coefficient in the second quartile), for firms in the
second, third and fourth quartiles the relationship between size and TFPR is very weak
in both countries.
Table B.3 Estimates of the relationship between TFPRsi and size
dependent variable: TFPRsi size 1-25th size 25-50th size 50-75th size 75-100th
independent variable: firm size
Chile 0.628*** 0.264** 0.0881 -0.00240
(0.0479) (0.109) (0.0677) (0.0254)
Observations 548 547 547 547
R2 0.240 0.011 0.003 0.000
Mexico 0.163*** 0.140 0.115 0.0640*
(0.0425) (0.0928) (0.0873) (0.0365)
Observations 544 544 544 543
R2 0.026 0.004 0.003 0.006
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
B.0.5 Elasticity of substitution
The elasticity of substitution describes how easily people preferences change across
the products produced by each sector when the prices of these products change. Elas-
ticity of substitution also determines the value of the markup charged by firms over the
marginal cost of production. Following Hsieh and Klenow [2009] I assumed the elasticity
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of substitution to be constant across industries and across countries. This is a very strong
assumption indeed. There are two main issues related to this assumption. First, if one
opts for a unique value of the parameter σ, convincing arguments are needed to justify the
value chosen since, as I will show, the value of σ influences a lot the magnitude of the re-
sults. Second, one might think that products produced by different sector do not have the
same elasticity of substitution because of the intrinsic characteristics of these products. A
variation of bread’s price will probably not have the same effect on my demand for bread
as it could have a variation of the price of glass products on my demand for glasses.
As for the first issue Hsieh and Klenow [2009] set the elasticity of substitution to 3
for all sectors and countries. As explained in their paper this value is at the low end of
empirical estimates (that give values from 3 to 10), but, since aggregate TFP gains are
positively correlated with σ by construction, they opt for the most conservative choice. As
Table (B.4) shows the estimates of aggregate TFP gains for Chile and Mexico are highly
sensitive to the value of this elasticity.
Table B.4 Robustness check: TFP gains from equalizing TFPRsi within
industries
σ = 5
Chile 1979 1983 1986
43.8 42.6 42.9
Mexico 1984 1986 1990
54.6 66.5 78.9
σ = 10
Chile 1979 1983 1986
78.2 78.3 78.9
Mexico 1984 1986 1990
114.7 124.2 147.8
As for the second issue - different elasticities of substitution in each sector - the main
problem is that there are no available estimates of these elasticities of substitution at
sectoral level for the countries object of this study.3
3An attempt to estimate the elasticities of substitution at industry level for the US has been made by
Broda and Weinstein [2006] who compute elasticities of substitution between varieties of each good for the
20 largest 3-digit sectors in US imports.
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B.0.6 Sensibility to outliers
Since all measures of variance are very sensible to outliers, I need to check the robust-
ness of my results to different cut-offs for outliers. Table (B.5) shows TFP gains from
cutting 10% of outliers (5% on each side of the distribution). With respect to the baseline
version where I cut only 1% of firms on each side of the TFPR and TFPQ distribution,
the TFP gains are now much lower. In 1986 they decrease from 20.2 to 2.1 for Chile and
from 32.1 to 10.6 for Mexico. This implies that results are highly sensible to the cut-off
chosen. At the same time, deciding which cutoff is the right one - considering that before
cutting tails an accurate data cleaning process has already being made - is not an innocent
choice and being excessively prudent (cutting the more, the better) could lead to lose an
important part of the story.
Table B.5 Robustness check: TFP gains from equalizing TFPRsi within
industries cutting 5% upper and lower tails in both TFPR and TFPQ
distributions
cut 5% top/bottom outliers
Chile 1979 1983 1986
7.0 4.3 2.1
Mexico 1984 1986 1990
8.1 10.6 10.8
B.0.7 Adjustment costs
Another possible source of variation in TFPRsi apart from distortions are the different
adjustment costs that could be faced by young and old firms. The idea is the following:
for young firms it could take a while before to understand how productive they are, and
once they discover to be more productive than they thought they will need some time to
increase the amount of inputs used for production. This implies we could observe some
firms to be very productive just because they are very young and still need to adjust the
amount of input they use to their productivity. If this is true we should observe TFPR
decreasing with age. Given firm’s age is not available for neither of the two countries this
robustness check can not be performed, even though this is clearly an issue.
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B.0.8 To sum up on robustness checks
Table (B.6) reports the TFP gains from equalizing TFPRsi within industries in 1986
under the different parameters’ values I checked in this section. What comes up is that the
choice of Chile as benchmark country is robust to changes in parameters’ values: Chile is
the closest country to its efficient benchmark in manufacturing output under all robustness
checks.
Table B.6 Robustness check: TFP gains from equalizing TFPRsi within
industries in 1986
year=1986 baseline K=energy L=employment σ = 5 σ = 10 cut 5% t/b outliers
Chile 20.2 34.9 45.7 42.9 78.9 2.1
Mexico 32.1 35.3 47.4 66.5 124.2 10.6
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